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ARTICLES
GUESS WHO?
REDUCING THE ROLE OF JURIES IN
DETERMINING LIBEL PLAINTIFFS’
IDENTITIES
NAT STERN†
INTRODUCTION
During the nomination hearings for now-Justice Brett
Kavanaugh, considerable attention was drawn to a high school
friend’s memoir featuring a fellow student named “Bart
O’Kavanaugh.”1 By the memoir’s account, “O’Kavanaugh” in one
episode blacked out—apparently from alcohol—on his return
from a party.2 For any number of possible reasons, Justice
Kavanaugh did not bring a libel suit against the book’s author. If
he had, however, a crucial threshold issue—preceding questions of
falsity and intent—would have been whether the memoir’s
portrayal of “O’Kavanaugh” amounted to a false depiction of
Kavanaugh himself. In the parlance of defamation doctrine,
Justice Kavanaugh would have to establish that the descriptions
of O’Kavanaugh’s behavior were “of and concerning” the
Justice himself.3
Though Kavanaugh did not bring such a suit, the outcome of
many other libel cases has hinged on whether expression that does
not explicitly refer to the plaintiff can nonetheless be treated as
defamatory. Much of this litigation arises from works that authors
†
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1
See Matthew Haag & Rebecca R. Ruiz, Mark Judge Says He’ll Talk to the F.B.I.
Here’s What We Know About Him, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes
.com/2018/09/27/us/mark-judge-kavanaugh-hearings.html.
2
See Dwight Garner, What a Book Critic Finds in Mark Judge’s ‘Wasted’ 21 Years
Later; Critic’s Notebook, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/
02/books/wasted-mark-judge-memoir.html.
3
See infra Part I.
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and publishers describe as fiction but which plaintiffs contend
contain defamatory representations of them.4 Another frequent
source involves members of a group who claim that, because they
have been collectively tarred, they have also been individually
defamed.5 In these and other cases where plaintiffs contend
that the defendant’s description of repugnant conduct is tacitly
about them, courts must first determine whether a jury could
rationally find that a reasonable reader would ascribe that conduct
to the plaintiff.6
This Article argues that the law should expressly recognize
a more dominant role for courts in resolving the issue of
plaintiff identity. Courts should not merely screen for minimum
plausibility in plaintiffs’ claims that derogatory expression falsely
casts them in a harsh light even though it does not purport to
describe them. Rather, courts should assertively employ First
Amendment doctrine and a range of evidentiary tools to ensure
that only genuinely ambiguous questions of plaintiff identity are
submitted to the jury. A specific mechanism by which to effectuate
this proposal would be to require by statute that allegedly
defamatory statements clearly refer to a plaintiff as a substantive
condition for liability. Such a change would reduce opportunities
for dubious and practically unreviewable7 jury findings that a
defendant has libeled the plaintiff in all but name.8 This approach
may also promote judicial economy and relieve some of the
scholarly criticism that judicial methods of ascertaining plaintiff
identity have lacked clarity and coherence.
Part I of this Article describes the “of and concerning”
requirement against the backdrop of the constitutional regime the
Supreme Court of the United States has established for
defamation. Part II explains the rationale for and operation of the
proposed expansion of judicial prerogative in resolving issues of
plaintiff identity. In Parts III, IV, and V, this Article examines
how such questions of alleged libel can be addressed in three
settings: fiction, statements about a group, and virtual worlds.

4

See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
6
See infra note 69 and accompanying text.
7
See infra notes 93–95 and accompanying text.
8
For the purposes of this Article, this category does not include instances where
a writer of fiction employs the plaintiff’s name but represents that the character is
meant as a fictional variation of the plaintiff. See infra note 164.
5
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THE “OF AND CONCERNING” REQUIREMENT IN
LAW AND PRACTICE

Long before the Supreme Court brought libel law within the
constitutional fold,9 courts recognized that successful defamation
claims must show that the allegedly false statement refers to
the plaintiff.10 A proper assessment of this element’s current
significance, however, must take account of the limitations on libel
actions now imposed by the First Amendment. Accordingly, an
overview of the Court’s handiwork in this area precedes a specific
focus on the “of and concerning” requirement.
A.

Libel’s Constitutional Framework

Though often criticized for a lack of cohesion,11 the Supreme
Court’s treatment of defamation has followed a discernible
trajectory. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court elevated
defamation’s rank from a class of speech essentially invisible to
the First Amendment to one squarely within its purview.12 The
Sullivan Court declared that restrictions on libel did not enjoy
“talismanic immunity” from constitutional scrutiny.13 From this
premise, and the Court’s understanding of “the central meaning of
the First Amendment,”14 flowed the rule that a public official
9

See infra notes 12–15 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Harris v. Zanone, 28 P. 845, 846–47 (Cal. 1892); Mix v. Woodward, 12
Conn. 262, 286–87 (1837); Hardy v. Williamson, 12 S.E. 874, 876 (Ga. 1891).
11
See, e.g., David A. Anderson, Rethinking Defamation, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1047,
1056 (2006) (lamenting that defamation law “gives us the worst of worlds”); Sheldon
W. Halpern, Of Libel, Language, and Law: New York Times v. Sullivan at
Twenty-Five, 68 N.C. L. REV. 273, 276 (1990) (criticizing the “fragmented, confusing
and unsatisfying array of criteria and requirements” of libel law); Joseph H. King,
Whither the “Paths of Glory”: The Scope of the New York Times Rule in Defamation
Claims by Former Public Officials and Candidates, 38 VT. L. REV. 275, 278 (2013)
(“[T]he Court [should] simply cut through the complex doctrinal underbrush in the
desultory inchoateness left in the wake of New York Times and its sequelae . . . .”);
Joshua B. Orenstein, Comment, Absolute Privilege from Defamation Claims and the
Devaluing of Teachers’ Professional Reputations, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 261, 267 (2005)
(describing American defamation law as “a hodgepodge of complex and contradictory
standards”); Mark P. Strasser, A Family Affair? Domestic Relations and Involuntary
Public Figure Status, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 69, 70 (2013) (“The Court’s inability
to adopt a coherent rationale combined with its unwillingness to apply the criteria
that it has announced have made this area of the law chaotic.”).
12
376 U.S. 254, 265–66 (1964); cf. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 257, 266
(1952) (stating that libelous statements “are of such slight social value . . . that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality”).
13
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269.
14
Id. at 273.
10
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could recover damages for a defamatory falsehood only upon
demonstrating “actual malice”—that is, that the defendant either
had knowledge that the defamatory statement concerning the
plaintiff’s official conduct was false or recklessly disregarded
whether it was false.15 Underscoring the stringency of this
requirement, the Court compelled officials to establish actual
malice with a “convincing clarity,” which appellate courts could
pronounce absent from the record.16
Sullivan launched a series of decisions that, for a time,
steadily produced safeguards against libel laws whose stringency
courted self-censorship not countenanced by the First
Amendment.17 To bolster the actual malice standard’s difficult
hurdle, the Court rejected plaintiffs’ efforts to meet the
requirement through means that did not strictly conform to its
definition. Neither a motive of animosity toward the plaintiff18 nor
failure to undertake the level of investigation that a reasonably
prudent person would conduct19 qualified. Further, the Court
indulged a latitude of interpretation that allowed libel defendants
to escape liability incurred by a literal or formal understanding of
their words. Thus, the specific circumstances under which
accusations of “treason”20 and “blackmail”21 were made prompted
the Court to treat them as rhetorical hyperbole rather than actual
charges of law-breaking. And in a major expansion of the actual
malice standard, the Court extended this formidable evidentiary
barrier to persons deemed public figures.22

15

Id. at 279–80.
Id. at 285–86.
17
See id. at 279 (“A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the
truth of all his factual assertions . . . leads to . . . self-censorship.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732 (1968) (“[T]o insure
the ascertainment and publication of the truth about public affairs, it is essential that
the First Amendment protect some erroneous publications as well as true ones.”).
18
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 72–73 (1964).
19
St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731–32.
20
Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S.
264, 285–86 (1974).
21
Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13–14 (1970).
22
Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring);
see Harry Kalven, Jr., The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and
Walker, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 267, 275–78 (detailing alignments of separate opinions
that forged this holding). During this period the Court also indicated that the “of and
concerning” requirement is constitutionally mandated. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383
U.S. 75, 82–83 (1966); Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 288–92. See infra notes 36–47 and
accompanying text for a discussion of this development.
16
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A decade after Sullivan, however, the Court began to trim the
“strategic protection” afforded to defamatory falsehoods.23 In
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court rescinded its extension of the
actual malice standard three years earlier to speech “involving
matters of public or general concern.”24 Instead, the Court
calibrated the level of a defendant’s intent that must be proved to
the status of the plaintiff. A plaintiff designated as a private figure
would not be required to show actual malice in order to recover
actual damages;25 such individuals were allowed to demonstrate
that the defendant had acted negligently in publishing the
falsehood.26 Only plaintiffs seeking presumed or punitive damages
would have to establish that the defendant’s conduct amounted to
actual malice.27 The Supreme Court heavily qualified this latter
protection in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.
by confining the requirement to plaintiffs suing for libel involving
a matter of public concern.28 Nor were private figure plaintiffs
the sole beneficiaries of the Court’s heightened willingness to
sanction state measures for protecting reputation. Government
could empower public officials and public figures suing media
plaintiffs to investigate their editorial processes in search of
evidence of actual malice.29
Still, the Court also issued rulings with potential to thwart
libel claims in several instances. For example, defendants could
obtain a summary judgment when a public figure’s opposing
affidavit fails to support a reasonable inference of actual malice by
clear and convincing evidence.30 Even defendants who survived
this hurdle and proceeded to win a jury verdict could be defeated
23

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
See id. at 347–48; Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43–44 (1971)
(Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (applying actual malice standard to all expression
“involving matters of public or general concern”).
25
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
26
Id. at 349.
27
Id.
28
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (Powell,
J., plurality opinion). While unresolved over three decades later, Dun & Bradstreet
also left open the possibility of still greater opportunities for private figures suing on
speech not of public concern. Since Gertz was treated as a ruling governing libel
involving a matter of public concern, id. at 756, it is debatable whether the Gertz’s
requirement of fault applies to suits where the element of public concern is absent.
See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 1:19 (2d ed. 2019); Ruth Walden &
Derigan Silver, Deciphering Dun & Bradstreet: Does the First Amendment Matter in
Private Figure-Private Concern Defamation Cases?, 14 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 4 (2009).
29
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175–76 (1979).
30
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255–56 (1986).
24
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by independent appellate review of determinations of actual
malice at trial.31 Further, though refusing to license wholesale
changes to plaintiffs’ quoted statements, deliberate alteration of a
plaintiff’s language would not constitute knowledge of falsity
“unless the alteration results in a material change in the meaning
conveyed by the statement.”32 With similar nuance, the Court
disavowed a categorical privilege for statements of opinion33 but
approvingly noted earlier rulings protecting statements that did
not “contain a provably false factual connotation” or that could not
“reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts.”34 Moreover,
at least in suits against media defendants for speech of public
concern, private figures were held to bear the burden of
demonstrating the falsity of the disputed assertion.35
B. The Fundamentality of the “Of and Concerning” Requirement
In a sense, the requirement that a defamatory statement be
directed at the plaintiff is inherent in the constitutional structure
described above and in the very concept of libel law. After all, the
Supreme Court’s various rules governing status, falsity, intent,
and construction all assume plaintiffs seeking relief from the harm
to their reputation caused by defendants’ statements about them.
Indeed, the Court has seemingly conferred constitutional stature
on the “of and concerning” requirement. Moreover, given the
doctrine’s long lineage and universal adoption, it would probably
persist—though potentially in less potent form—even in the
absence of constitutional prescription. The necessity of satisfying
the “of and concerning” requirement, as well as the basic outline
31
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984). This
review has proved invaluable to defendants in a large proportion of cases. See Susanna
Frederick Fischer, Rethinking Sullivan: New Approaches in Australia, New Zealand,
and England, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 101, 187 (2002) (“In trials where actual
malice was at issue, the reversal rate of judgments for plaintiff was almost 70%.”);
Susan M. Gilles, Taking First Amendment Procedure Seriously: An Analysis of Process
in Libel Litigation, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1753, 1806 (1998) (referring to “high reversal rate
of juries on the issue of actual malice”).
32
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991).
33
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990). Prior to Milkovich,
courts had generally drawn a distinction under the First Amendment between
statements of fact, which were actionable, and statements of opinion, which were not.
See Ronald K. Chen, Once More into the Breach: Fact Versus Opinion Revisited After
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 1 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 331, 351–65 (1991);
Martin F. Hansen, Fact, Opinion, and Consensus: The Verifiability of Allegedly
Defamatory Speech, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 43, 47–49 (1993).
34
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 (citation omitted).
35
Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776–77 (1986).
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of this principle, appears settled. Disputes continue in the grey
area where defendants’ allegedly false statements do not plainly
refer to the plaintiff.
While the Supreme Court has not expressly endorsed the “of
and concerning” requirement, the Court’s opinions in Sullivan and
Rosenblatt v. Baer36 lend strong support to the requirement’s
constitutional status. Having already disposed of Sullivan’s suit
for failure to show actual malice, the Court noted an additional
deficiency in his claim. The newspaper advertisement, over which
Montgomery, Alabama, City Commissioner Sullivan sued,
criticized the actions of the “police” for actions taken against civil
rights demonstrators; Sullivan contended that readers would
interpret the criticism and certain of its allegations as charging
him with misconduct as supervisor of the police department.37 In
the eyes of the Court, however, the statements in question did not
“make even an oblique reference to [Sullivan] as an individual.”38
Therefore, the evidence in the record was “incapable of supporting
the jury’s finding that the allegedly libelous statements were made
‘of and concerning’ respondent.”39 The Court expressed special
concern that a contrary ruling would “transmut[e] criticism of
government, however impersonal it may seem on its face, into
personal criticism, and hence potential libel, of the officials of
whom the government is composed.”40
Such alchemy, the
Court suggested, was reminiscent of the discredited Sedition Act
of 1798.41
Similar considerations informed the outcome in Rosenblatt
two years later. There, a newspaper column raised questions
about the performance of a later-disbanded commission on which
the plaintiff had served.42 Though the plaintiff was not mentioned
in the column, he argued that it would be perceived as charging
him with mismanagement and peculation.43 Rejecting this theory,
the Court invoked Sullivan for the proposition that, absent a
demonstrable focus on the plaintiff, “an otherwise impersonal
attack on governmental operations cannot be utilized to establish

36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43

383 U.S. 75, 80 (1966).
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 289.
Id.
Id. at 288.
Id. at 292.
See id. at 273–76.
See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 78–79 (1966).
Id. at 79.
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a libel of those administering the operations.”44 It is true that
Sullivan and Rosenblatt could be construed as limited to the
Court’s special solicitude for the core First Amendment values
implicated by criticism of government.45 However, the two
decisions have been generally viewed by both courts46 and
commentators47 as more broadly constitutionalizing the “of and
concerning” requirement.
Whether as a product of this conclusion or not, the
requirement has been virtually universally recognized as an
essential component of a defamation cause of action. The
Restatement sets forth as the threshold element of a defamatory
action “a false and defamatory statement concerning another.”48
State supreme courts routinely affirm the principle that libel
claims must be “of and concerning” the plaintiff.49 A review of
decisions on this point reveals no deviation among courts on this
principle other than occasional variation in the language used.50
44

Id. at 80.
See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (“[T]he Court has frequently
reaffirmed that speech on public issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of
First Amendment values, and is entitled to special protection.” (internal citations and
internal quotation marks omitted)); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886,
913 (1982) (“There is a ‘profound national commitment’ to the principle that ‘debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’ ” (quoting Sullivan,
376 U.S. at 270)); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (“[T]here is practically
universal agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the
free discussion of governmental affairs . . . of course includ(ing) discussions of
candidates . . . .” (alterations in original) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,
218 (1966))).
46
See, e.g., Steam Press Holdings, Inc. v. Haw. Teamsters & Allied Workers
Union, Loc. 996, 302 F.3d 998, 1004 (9th Cir. 2002); Emerito Estrada Rivera-Isuzu De
P.R., Inc. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 233 F.3d 24, 26–28 (1st Cir. 2000); Blatty
v. N.Y. Times Co., 728 P.2d 1177, 1182 (Cal. 1986); QSP, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
773 A.2d 906, 916 n.14 (Conn. 2001).
47
See, e.g., SMOLLA, supra note 28 at § 4:40.50 (describing the requirement as “a
rule of constitutional dimension”); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, False Light Invasion
of Privacy: The Light That Failed, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 364, 428 n.351 (1989) (stating
that in Sullivan the requirement was “elevated to the status of a constitutional
requirement”); Julie J. Srochi, Note, Must Peaches Be Preserved at All Costs:
Questioning the Constitutional Validity of Georgia’s Perishable Product
Disparagement Law, 12 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1223, 1231 n.62, 1232–33 (1996).
48
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558(a) (AM. LAW. INST. 1977).
49
See, e.g., Bierman v. Weier, 826 N.W.2d 436, 464 (Iowa 2013); Bouis v. Mueller,
861 N.W.2d 620, 620–21 (Mich. 2015); Three Amigos SJL Rest., Inc. v. CBS News Inc.,
28 N.Y.3d 82, 84 (2016); Pratt v. Nelson, 164 P.3d 366, 381–82 (Utah 2007); Schaecher
v. Bouffault, 772 S.E.2d 589, 598 (Va. 2015).
50
See, e.g., Blatty v. N.Y. Times Co., 728 P.2d 1177, 1183 (Cal. 1986) (referring to
“specific reference requirement”); QSP, Inc., 773 A.2d at 916 (requiring that actionable
“statement identified the . . . plaintiff[] to a reasonable third person”).
45
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Additionally, consensus appears to exist on basic features
of the requirement. First, of course, the plaintiff need not be
expressly named to satisfy the requirement.51 This principle is
foundational because if only explicit references were actionable, it
would obviate the need for inquiry into whether a statement is
about the plaintiff.52 In determining whether libel refers to the
plaintiff in the absence of such references, courts look to whether
the statement would be reasonably understood by readers or
listeners in light of all the circumstances.53 The relevant audience
for this purpose is people who knew or knew of the plaintiff.54
An often-pivotal aspect of the requirement is that the plaintiff
bears a substantial burden to prove that the libelous expression
was of and concerning the plaintiff.55 Affirming this principle, the
New York Court of Appeals went on to conclude in Julian v.
American Business Consultants, Inc. that “[t]he indispensable

51
See, e.g., Bartholomew v. YouTube, LLC, 225 Cal. Rptr. 3d 917, 927 (Ct. App.
2017); Wisner v. Nichols, 143 N.W. 1020, 1025 (Iowa 1913); Dijkstra v. Westerink, 401
A.2d 1118, 1120 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979); Three Amigos SJL Rest., Inc., 28
N.Y.3d at 88 (Stein, J., dissenting); Nelson v. Am. Hometown Publ’g, Inc., 333 P.3d
962, 969–70 (Okla. Civ. App. 2014); Main v. Royall, 348 S.W.3d 381, 395 (Tex.
App. 2011).
52
However, there would still remain some instances where a defendant could
argue that the literal use of the plaintiff’s name was not intended to refer to the
“actual” defendant. See infra note 164.
53
See, e.g., Davis v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 191 F.2d 901, 904 (8th Cir. 1951)
(“The issue was whether persons who knew or knew of the plaintiff could reasonably
have understood the exhibited picture to refer to him.”); Elias v. Rolling Stone LLC,
192 F. Supp. 3d 383, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“[T]he party alleging defamation must show
that it is reasonable to conclude that the publication refers to him or her . . . .”), rev’d
in part, 873 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2017); Bindrim v. Mitchell, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 39 (Ct. App.
1979) (“The test is whether a reasonable person, reading the book, would understand
that the fictional character therein pictured was, in actual fact, the plaintiff acting as
described.”), overruled on other grounds by McCoy v. Hearst Corp., 727 P.2d 711 (Cal.
1986); Boardman & Cartwright v. Gazette Co., 281 N.W. 118, 120 (Iowa 1938) (“[I]t is
not necessary to constitute a libel that the article name the person libeled, but it must
by inference or innuendo at least refer in an [intelligible] way to the person libeled.”);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564 & cmts. a, b, d.
54
See, e.g., Dalbec v. Gentleman’s Companion, Inc., 828 F.2d 921, 925 (2d Cir.
1987); Butowsky v. Folkenflik, No. 4:18CV442, 2019 WL 2518833, at *38 (E.D. Tex.
Apr. 17, 2019), adopted by No. 4:18cv442, 2019 WL 3712026 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 2019);
Church of Scientology Int’l v. Time Warner, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1157, 1160 (S.D.N.Y.
1992), aff’d sub nom. Church of Scientology Int’l v. Behar, 238 F.3d 168 (2d Cir. 2001);
Allied Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 111 S.W.3d 168, 173 (Tex.
App. 2003).
55
See Kramer v. Skyhorse Publ’g, Inc., 45 Misc. 3d 315, 321 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty.
2014) (“[T]he plaintiff has a heavy burden, even at the pleading stage, of establishing
that the statement was actually about him.”).
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proof is lacking.”56 Other courts have likewise underscored this
evidentiary hurdle in the course of deciding that the plaintiff failed
to show the necessary identification.57 In other instances, the
weight of this burden has been demonstrated by the court’s
skepticism rather than a formal pronouncement. Two frequently
cited cases, Clare v. Farrell58 and Davis v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures,59
illustrate this phenomenon.
In Clare, the defendant had published a novel whose title
character bore the name of the plaintiff and engaged in a number
of “sordid experiences.”60 Like the plaintiff, the novel’s protagonist
was a writer, and his physical appearance as described in the book
purportedly matched that of the plaintiff.61 Notwithstanding this
confluence of similarities, however, the district court granted
summary judgment to the author and the publisher.62 Under the
evidence required to show that the novel amounted to a portrayal
of the plaintiff, “no jury could find otherwise.”63
In Davis, the medium was film, but the plaintiff’s logic and its
rejection by the court were the same.64 There, one of the movie’s
principal characters shared the name of the plaintiff and pursued
what might be viewed as a darker version of the plaintiff’s life.65
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, emphasizing that the
perception of a work describing the plaintiff must be “reasonable,”
refused to upset the jury’s verdict for the studio.66 It is true that
defendants in the two cases benefited from representing their
work as fiction. Still, the label of fiction does not always create
immunity for the creator,67 and a less imposing standard of proof
might have enabled at least one of these plaintiffs to recover.

56

2 N.Y.2d 1, 18 (1956).
See Kirch v. Liberty Media Corp., 449 F.3d 388, 398 (2d Cir. 2006); Fornshill v.
Ruddy, 891 F. Supp. 1062, 1069–70 (D. Md. 1995); Cox Tex. Newspapers, L.P. v.
Penick, 219 S.W.3d 425, 433 (Tex. App. 2007); Camer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer,
723 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
58
70 F. Supp. 276 (D. Minn. 1947).
59
191 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1951).
60
Clare, 70 F. Supp. at 277.
61
See id. at 276–77.
62
Id. at 281.
63
Id. at 278.
64
Davis, 191 F.2d at 902.
65
See id.
66
Id. at 904–05.
67
See infra Part III, discussing the problem of libel through fiction.
57
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Though the burden of showing that a defamatory statement is
“of and concerning” the plaintiff is “not a light one,”68 the
enterprise is aided by the range of evidence that a plaintiff may
introduce. In particular, the plaintiff is not confined to the
communication at issue in seeking to prove that it is about the
plaintiff. Rather, the plaintiff may present extrinsic facts
showing that a reasonable reader or auditor would understand
the expression in context as referring to the plaintiff.69 The
admissibility of such evidence, however, is subject to a significant
constraint: the outside facts adduced must have been known to
those who read or heard the communication.70 The Restatement
provides: “Not only must the plaintiff prove the publication of the
defamatory matter, but . . . he must satisfy the court that it was
understandable as intended to refer to himself, and must convince
the jury that it was so understood.”71 And indeed, courts have
often stated that where an expression is reasonably understood to
refer to the plaintiff, absence of intent does not relieve the
defendant of liability.72
At the same time, however, courts, when rejecting claims for
lack of reference to the plaintiff, have often highlighted evidence
that the defendant did not mean to describe the plaintiff.73
Moreover, First Amendment doctrine raises doubt as to whether a
regime of strict liability on this point would pass constitutional
muster. Perhaps for that reason, courts often note a defendant’s
negligence in failing to realize that its defamatory depiction could

68

Handelman v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 1048, 1050 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
See, e.g., Dorn v. Astra USA, 975 F. Supp. 388, 396 (D. Mass. 1997); Gales v.
CBS Broad., Inc., No. Civ.A.5:03-CV-35(BR), 2004 WL 1961680, at *9 (S.D. Miss. July
9, 2004); Bierman v. Weier, 826 N.W.2d 436, 464–65 (Iowa 2013); New England
Tractor-Trailer Training of Conn., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 480 N.E.2d 1005, 1011
(Mass. 1985); Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 325 S.E.2d 713, 738 (Va. 1985).
70
See, e.g., Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines Inc., 164 F.3d 186, 189 (3d Cir.
1998); Chicherchia v. Cleary, 207 A.D.2d 855, 856 (2d Dep’t 1994); Berry v. Safer, 293
F. Supp. 2d 694, 701 (S.D. Miss. 2003).
71
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 613 cmt. d (emphasis added).
72
See, e.g., Weinstein v. Bullick, 827 F. Supp. 1193, 1201 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Zerpol
Corp. v. DMP Corp., 561 F. Supp. 404, 410–11 (E.D. Pa. 1983); New England
Tractor-Trailer Training of Conn., Inc., 480 N.E.2d at 1009–10; Cheatum v. Wehle, 5
N.Y.2d 585, 594 (1959); Marr v. Putnam, 246 P.2d 509, 521 (Or. 1952).
73
See, e.g., Clare v. Farrell, 70 F. Supp. 276, 278 (D. Minn. 1947); Ellis v. Safety
Ins. Co., 672 N.E.2d 979, 984 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996); Landau v. Columbia Broad. Sys.,
Inc., 205 Misc. 357, 361–62 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1954); Vice v. Kasprzak, 318 S.W.3d
1, 13 (Tex. App. 2009).
69
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be reasonably understood as referring to the plaintiff.74 At a
minimum, it is difficult to reconcile strict liability with the
demanding evidentiary requirements of actual malice where that
standard applies.75
II. MAKING PLAINTIFF IDENTIFICATION—MAINLY—A
MATTER FOR JUDGES
For reasons discussed below, courts should be afforded more
authority to determine whether plaintiffs have presented
sufficient evidence that a defamatory statement is about them to
proceed to trial. This shift in allocation of responsibilities could be
accomplished in a number of ways. A straightforward means,
though perhaps unrealistically novel, would be to remove the
question from juries altogether and assign it to courts—at least
under state law.76
A less dramatic change, though still
substantial, would be to ratchet up the standard for establishing
this element of a defamation claim to “clear and convincing
evidence.” With that obstacle confronting plaintiffs, courts would
more frequently dismiss on the pleadings or at summary judgment
claims presenting this issue.77 Or in a similar vein, but perhaps
more palatable—as suggested earlier—the most effective means of
greater judicial screening of dubious claims of identity may
be simply to require that defamatory statements clearly refer to
a plaintiff.
Admittedly, these proposals are probably unattainable
without statutory enactment. Even under existing law, however,
courts have more latitude than is often recognized or exercised to
reject claims involving plaintiff identity before they reach the jury.
In particular, a more robust examination of evidence presented at
summary judgment could spare the costs of a trial and possible

74
See, e.g., Stanton v. Metro Corp., 438 F.3d 119, 128 (1st Cir. 2006); Godbout v.
Cousens, 485 N.E.2d 940, 946 (Mass. 1985); Downey v. Chutehall Constr. Co., 19
N.E.3d 470, 476 (Mass. App. Ct. 2014); Nelson v. Am. Hometown Publ’g, Inc., 333 P.3d
962, 970 (Okla. Civ. App. 2014).
75
See supra notes 14–22 and accompanying text.
76
See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 867–68 (2010) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
77
This impact could be limited by courts’ reluctance to grant summary judgment
where credibility is at issue. However, the value of witness testimony in this context
is generally insubstantial. See infra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
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reversal on appeal arising from inadequate claims.78 While a
complaint advances a one-sided perspective, summary judgment
gives the court the opportunity to consider the evidence and the
arguments of both sides. In this setting, it is especially important
that parties can introduce at this stage any evidence that would
be admissible at trial.79 Thus, for example, parties can offer
affidavits supporting or contradicting the plaintiff’s assertion that
the defamatory material referred to the plaintiff.80
It is true that dismissal of a case on this ground at summary
judgment precludes jurors’ evaluation of witnesses, but in general
this assessment seems to add little benefit anyway—especially if
the plaintiff’s intent is not part of the equation.81 Even with
respect to reasonable perception of the defendant’s expression, the
utility of witnesses is doubtful. As a practical matter, it seems
doubtful in most cases that a sufficient sampling of witnesses can
be gathered to gauge the perspective of the average reader.
Assuming, though, that a satisfactory threshold can sometimes
be met, their probative value is questionable. Jurors would
presumably watch dueling processions of witnesses cherry-picked
by each side to support its contention that the communication at
issue was or was not about the plaintiff.82 Survey evidence of the
writing’s audience, collected by a special master and submitted to
the court, would bypass these tendentious witnesses. Of course,
cases can arise in which live testimony will possibly shed light on
whether the defendant’s statement refers to the plaintiff.
However, courts should forego summary judgment on this issue
only where this is manifestly the case.
More vigorous judicial evaluation of plaintiff identity does not
drastically invade jury prerogative in another sense as well.
The Supreme Court has displayed a willingness to rule on
what constitutes reasonable perception where constitutional
78

But see John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
522, 522 (2007) (arguing that summary judgment, on balance, increases costs,
inefficiency, and unfairness of the civil justice system).
79
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(4); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.510(e); OHIO R. CIV. P. 56(E);
TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(f).
80
In the setting of administrative law, the Supreme Court has recognized that
submission of documents rather than a live hearing may often suffice as a basis for
taking away a person’s property interest. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
332–35, 344–46 (1976).
81
See infra notes 229–242 and accompanying text.
82
For a skeptical view of the value of deciding credibility by presenting live
witness testimony to juries, see Mark Spottswood, Live Hearings and Paper Trials, 38
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 827, 837–51 (2011).
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guarantees are at stake. A notable example can be found in
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. There, the Court has
sometimes weighed whether a government practice or gesture can
be reasonably viewed as endorsing or supporting religion.83 In
these instances, the Court has not been deterred by consciousness
that its constitutional ruling is rooted in its evaluation of the
facts.84 Similarly, the Court has exercised independent judgment
in determining what constitutes a citizen’s reasonable, subjective
expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment in various
scenarios.85 Granted these analogies are imperfect in that they do
not purport to gauge the actual views of specific audiences.
Nevertheless, it is already implicit in present doctrine—which
permits courts to determine what an audience cannot reasonably
conclude—that courts have the capacity to judge the reactions of
auditors and readers.
While the approach proposed here would presumably subject
fewer defendants to trial on the issue of plaintiff identity, it would
not invariably operate as a one-way ratchet. On the contrary,
there could also be suits in which a libel suit raising multiple
issues—for example, public figure status—could be pruned of
tenuous defendant assertions about identity before the case
reached the jury. Unless the “of and concerning” issue is
inextricably intertwined with other questions, jurors would
benefit from the ability to focus on essential questions before them.
Achieving this result does not call for major institutional change.
Courts need only seriously scrutinize the evidence presented and
settle a resolvable issue rather than abdicate this determination
to the jury.
Still, it must be acknowledged that the principal impetus for
the proposal is adequate protection of free speech. The elaborate
body of First Amendment doctrine governing libel represents the
Court’s effort to balance the right of free expression with the
state’s interest in protecting individual reputation from false

83
See McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 866, 869 (2005); Santa Fe Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000); Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573,
616, 620 (1989), abrogated in part by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565,
578–81 (2014).
84
See Cty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620; Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693–94
(1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)
85
Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1527 (2018); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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charges.86 The result is a distinctive hybrid of tort law and speech
regulation. Though the state’s power to award damages “reflects
no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth
of every human being,”87 that interest does not apply to instances
in which the defendant has not accused the plaintiff of anything.
With respect to ascertaining plaintiff identity, two dangers
stand out from inferring too readily that speech not purporting to
be about the plaintiff actually refers to that person. First,
especially in the realm of fiction, a speaker may be deterred by the
specter of unwittingly portraying repugnant conduct by someone
whose description matches the plaintiff. As the court observed in
Clare v. Farrell, “It would have been a practical impossibility
for the defendant in the exercise of reasonable care to have
discovered the existence of the plaintiff.”88 Though Clare was
decided before the advent of the internet, its essential rationale
stands: writers and other speakers should not be held responsible
for exhausting every possibility that their words could apply to an
unknown person.89
In addition, given the complexity of defamation doctrine, even
to many trained in law, the “of and concerning” requirement
may be especially susceptible to misapplication by juries. With
elements of libel actions like negligence and actual malice, jurors
render an assessment of the defendant’s state of mind when
committing the defamatory falsehood. Determining levels of
intent is by no means a simple task, but it falls squarely within
the traditional province of juries.90 Likewise, if it is established
that the defendant’s statement does refer to the plaintiff, as is
self-evident in most cases, juries are competent to evaluate the
statement’s truth or falsity. Where the putative reference is not
clear, though, determining its presence partakes more of textual
interpretation that courts are accustomed to making and less

86
See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1990); Phila.
Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 773 (1986); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S.
448, 456 (1976).
87
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
88
70 F. Supp. 276, 279 (D. Minn. 1947).
89
See Landau v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 205 Misc. 357, 360–61 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty.
1954) (“To make such accidental or coincidental use of a name a libel would impose a
prohibitive burden upon authors . . . .”) (rejecting claim arising from fictional
television crime program).
90
See, e.g., 40A AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 450 (2019) (“The question of intent with
which a homicidal act was committed is ordinarily deemed to be a question for the
determination of the jury.”).
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deciding concrete facts. Thus, this exercise appears to resemble
judicial functions like statutory construction and fixing the
meaning of a contract term91 more than reaching a verdict on
whether a defendant ran a red light or accepted a bribe.92
Further, excessive reluctance to dismiss a libel claim before
trial when the heavy burden of showing a statement’s reference to
the plaintiff cannot be met creates a problem of reviewability.
Deferring the question of plaintiff identity to the jury may enable
it to mistakenly find that speech refers to the plaintiff without
realistic opportunity to correct the error. Except where the jury
has reached an emphatically irrational conclusion, courts are
reluctant in motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or
on appeal to upset what is designated a factual conclusion.93
Moreover, this problem is compounded by the secrecy of jury
deliberations and the nature of general verdicts. Except in the
unusual case of special interrogatories,94 a jury verdict does not
reflect the particular determinations made in reaching the

91

See L.P.P.R., Inc. v. Keller Crescent Corp., 532 F. App’x 268, 273–75 (3d Cir.
2013) (“[T]here is no role for the jury to play in contract interpretation when there is
no ambiguity.”); Parsons v. Bristol Dev. Co., 402 P.2d 839, 842–43 (Cal. 1965)
(“[U]nless the interpretation turns upon the credibility of extrinsic evidence,”
interpretation of a contract is purely a “judicial function”).
92
Much of this same reasoning could be brought to bear on the question of
whether a libel defendant’s statement was an actual fact rather than merely the
defendant’s view. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. Indeed, the two
issues may be seen as overlapping where parties dispute whether defendants’
expression actually portrayed plaintiffs or only fanciful versions of them. This
similarity in considerations may help to explain why courts so often rule at summary
judgment or on appeal that the defendant did not assert a provably false fact. See, e.g.,
Nat’l Ass’n of Gov’t Emps./Int’l Bhd. of Police Officers v. BUCI Television, Inc., 118 F.
Supp. 2d 126, 130 (D. Mass. 2000); Romero v. Thomson Newspapers (Wis.), Inc., 648
So. 2d 866, 870 (La. 1995); Lyons v. Globe Newspaper Co., 612 N.E.2d 1158, 1163,
1165 (Mass. 1993). Nevertheless, as a relative matter, it is safer to entrust juries with
deciding whether a communication can be reasonably understood as hurling factual
charges at the plaintiff than with whether they were aimed at the plaintiff in the first
place. For the reasons discussed above, courts are better equipped to assess questions
of plaintiff identity. On the other hand, once it is settled that a statement refers to the
defendant, jurors can draw on their own experiences and perceptions to decide
whether it should be read as containing a provably false assertion.
93
Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1983); 4 N.Y.
JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 529 (2019).
94
See Foster v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 131 F.2d 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1942)
(noting that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 49 authorizing special
interrogatories is “seldom used”).
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decision.95 Thus, unsupportable logic employed to infer that a
defamatory falsehood was of and concerning the plaintiff may be
cloaked by a verdict reflecting multiple bases for liability.
Even in cases where jury competence on this issue is high,
probing judicial scrutiny of plaintiff identity can serve the goal of
judicial economy. Libel suits sharply increased several decades
ago and have not significantly decreased in volume.96 Measures
that streamline these suits supply welcome relief to this burden
on the courts. Where disputed speech cannot plausibly be viewed
as referring to the plaintiff, the time and costs of trial should
be avoided. Again, it bears emphasizing that more robust
enforcement of the “of and concerning” requirement would not
generally stifle libel claims—the great majority of which hinge on
other issues.97
And of course, even where this issue does arise, heightened
scrutiny does not inevitably spell defeat for plaintiffs. Two leading
cases illustrate that, even in the realm of fiction, plaintiffs can
make a powerful prima facie case that a work can reasonably be
viewed as portraying them.98 In Geisler v. Petrocelli, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals refused to dismiss Geisler’s suit over
Petrocelli’s “potboiler . . . concerning the odyssey of a female
transsexual athlete through the . . . corrupting world of the
women’s professional tennis circuit.”99 The main character, who
participated in a tennis fraud and engaged in graphically
described “untoward” sex, had Geisler’s exact name and
allegedly bore Geisler’s physical appearance.100
Nor could
the resemblance—more substantial than that in Clare v.
Farrell101—convincingly be chalked up to coincidence; Geisler and
Petrocelli had become acquainted while working at the same small
publishing firm for six months.102

95

See Nollenberger v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 734, 738 (S.D. Cal.
1963) (“[Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 49] is designed to take some of the
mystery out of general verdicts where, in case after case, neither counsel for either
side nor the Court have been able to reconcile the verdict with the evidence.”).
96
See Pamela C. Laucella & Barbara Osborne, Libel and College Coaches, 12 J.
LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 183, 188 (2002).
97
See Daniel Smirlock, Note, “Clear and Convincing” Libel: Fiction and the Law
of Defamation, 92 YALE L.J. 520, 529 (1983).
98
See infra Part III for a discussion of the possibility of libel through fiction.
99
616 F.2d 636, 638 (2d Cir. 1980).
100
Id.
101
See supra notes 60–63 and accompanying text.
102
Geisler, 616 F.2d at 638.
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In Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., the Second Circuit allowed
a suit to proceed over a novel written by the plaintiff’s brother.103
Unlike in Geisler, the defendant did not appropriate the plaintiff’s
name for the chief character. The story’s alleged resemblance to
the plaintiff’s life, however—aside from the character’s
opprobrious conduct—was striking if not comprehensive. Like the
plaintiff, the main character was the eldest child and twenty-three
years old in 1938, was Latvian, and looked after the family.104 The
composition of the family, whose travels the novel depicts,
matched the Fetlers down to the number of children—thirteen—
as well as the precise distribution of its girls and boys.105 Like the
Fetlers, too, the fictional family bought a home in Stockholm.106 In
both families, the father was a Russian Protestant minister who
brought the family around Europe in an old bus to perform
concerts as a band and choir.107 While such details did not prove
that the book libeled the plaintiff, it is hard to fault the court for
permitting a jury to weigh that question.108
These exceptional instances, however, do not remove the need
to dismiss unconvincing assertions of plaintiff identity to protect
core First Amendment values. That need is especially pronounced
with respect to media coverage of current events. A central
purpose of the First Amendment was to preserve free public
discussion of matters of public concern.109 In one of the principal
arenas of “of and concerning” issues, the general bar to suits based
on libel of large groups,110 courts have recognized the rule’s
advancement of this aim.111 Some have particularly emphasized
103

364 F.2d 650, 650 (2d Cir. 1966).
Id. at 651.
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
This discussion of Geisler and Fetler assumes, as current law permits, that
fiction can be a vehicle for defamation. See infra notes 169–171 and accompanying
text for an argument to the contrary.
109
See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421–22 (1988); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S.
214, 218–19 (1966); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 391–92 (1962); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101–02 (1940).
110
See infra Part IV.
111
See, e.g., Mich. United Conservation Clubs v. CBS News, 485 F. Supp. 893, 900
(W.D. Mich. 1980) (stating that suits by members of large groups could “seriously
interfere with public discussion of issues, or groups, which are in the public eye” and
“result in the public receiving less information about topics of general concern”), aff’d,
665 F.2d 110 (6th Cir. 1981); Art of Living Found. v. Does, No. 10–CV–05022–LHK,
2011 WL 2441898, at *6 (N.D. Ca. June 15, 2011) (“The rationale for [the group libel]
rule is to protect freedom of public discussion . . . .”); Three Amigos SJL Rest., Inc. v.
104
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the vital role of journalists in promoting this discussion.112 Suits
based on group libel of political organizations, where interests
at the heart of the First Amendment are at stake, should
trigger special vigilance. Charges against such organizations have
sometimes provoked suits by a prominent member.113 At the same
time, courts should also take care that general references to actors
in matters of public concern outside the political sphere—from
whatever source—are not subject to overly facile translations into
individual charges.114
Courts have displayed varying sensitivity to their duty to
screen suits against news providers for inadequate evidence of
plaintiff identity. In Smith v. Huntington Publishing Co., the
court recognized that a coincidence of names and similarity of
circumstances did not automatically qualify a libel claim for
trial.115 Agreeing to substitute fictitious names, the defendant’s

CBS News Inc.,132 A.D.3d 82, 93 n.2 (1st Dep’t 2015) (“[The group libel rule is
designed] to ‘encourage frank discussions of matters of public concern under the First
Amendment guarantees.’ ” (quoting Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 84 A.D.2d
226, 229 (2d Dep’t 1981))), aff’d, 28 N.Y.S.3d 82 (2016).
112
See, e.g., PetRays Veterinary Radiology Consultants v. DVM Insight, Inc., No.
D062821, 2013 WL 6628083, at *11 (Dec. 16, 2013); Schuster v. U.S. News & World
Report, Inc., 602 F.2d 850, 853 (8th Cir. 1979) (rejecting libel claim by member of
group in light of the “importance of journalistic freedom in investigating and reporting
on matters of public interest” under the First Amendment); Barger v. Playboy Enters.,
Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1151, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (stating that the group libel rule
“safeguards freedom of speech by effecting a sound compromise between . . . the
societal interest in free press discussions of matters of general concern, and . . . the
individual interest in reputation.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)),
aff’d, 732 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1984).
113
See, e.g., Palin v. N.Y. Times Co., 933 F.3d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 2019) (suit by
former vice presidential candidate arising from editorial criticizing her political action
committee); Schonek v. WJAC, Inc., 258 A.2d 504, 506–07 (Pa. 1969) (suit by a leader
of group financing committee charged with “pilfering” and “doctoring” campaign
document).
114
See, e.g., Golden North Airways, Inc. v. Tanana Publ’g Co., 218 F.2d 612,
615–16, 622 (9th Cir. 1954) (dismissing complaint by air carrier based on newspaper
editorial critical of all non-scheduled air carriers); Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v.
Whelan, 492 F. Supp. 374, 380–81 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (granting summary judgment to
defendants nutritionist and physician to remarks in newspaper and magazine
asserting that some in industry were “quacks” or practiced “quackery”); Julian v. Am.
Bus. Consultants, Inc., 2 N.Y.2d 1, 11–12 (1956) (dismissing complaint by plaintiff
over a book’s report that he attended two meetings by Communist front organizations
seven years apart where the book used caustic language to describe broadly those who
were exploited by such organizations); Worldnet Software Co. v. Gannett Satellite
Info. Network, Inc., 702 N.E.2d 149, 152–54 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (dismissing claims
based on alleged defamatory statements about a software company, made in
newspaper and on television, brought by operator of company).
115
410 F. Supp. 1270, 1273–74 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
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newspaper obtained the consent of a woman and her son to report
on their experiences arising from the son’s drug addiction and
mental problems.116 After the plaintiffs informed the newspaper
that the names chosen and problems faced matched their own, the
newspaper reiterated in headline form the original story’s
highlighted statement that the names were fictitious.117 Finding
these measures ensured that “no reasonable person could have
reasonably believed that the article pointed to the plaintiff,” the
court granted summary judgment for the defendant.118
More problematic in its approach was the decision in Hudson
v. Guy Gannett Broadcasting Co.119 Overturning the lower court,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine denied summary judgment
to the defendant over its broadcast of a report that a mill had
terminated twelve employees—none of whom were named—for
involvement with illegal drugs.120 Although the plaintiff was one
of the twelve fired employees, he was actually dismissed for
alleged alcohol abuse rather than drug-related involvement like
the other eleven.121 A coworker averred that his learning the day
after the report aired that Hudson had been among those
terminated caused the coworker to believe that Hudson had been
dismissed over illegal drugs.122 This affidavit—coupled with
Hudson’s allegation that others in the community had gained this
same impression—was found sufficient to allow the suit to go
forward.123 Though the existence of such a perception may have
been plausible, the threshold permitted to establish it is troubling.
A single affidavit supported by a plaintiff’s self-serving declaration
obviously does not satisfy the heavy burden124 for meeting the “of
and concerning” requirement where the plaintiff has not been
named. Such logic opens the door to authorization of trials based
on skimpy and biased evidence that third parties have connected
the dots between an unspecific news report and the plaintiff.125
116

Id. at 1272.
Id.
118
Id. at 1274.
119
521 A.2d 714 (Me. 1987).
120
Id. at 714.
121
Id. at 715.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 716–17, 718.
124
See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text.
125
By contrast, the denial of summary judgment to the defendant in Nelson v.
Am. Hometown Publ’g, Inc., 333 P.3d 962, 966 (Okla. Civ. App. 2014), rested on a
direct link to the plaintiff that yielded demonstrable harm. A list of sex offenders
published by the defendant newspaper had incorrectly placed the plaintiffs’ address
117
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Television news is especially susceptible to unforeseen claims
that it has defamed the plaintiff, because the accompaniment of
words by images can create unforeseen alleged associations. In
particular, plaintiffs may perceive a broadcast as tying them to a
broadcast’s report of offensive or shameful behavior. In Sims v.
Kiro, Inc., the court recognized the danger of permitting a claim to
proceed on the basis of too speculative a link.126 A television
newscast disparaging bicentennial merchandise on sale at the
Seattle Center had included closeup shots of merchandise on
display in the plaintiff’s store.127
These shots did not
picture either the plaintiff or his shop.128 Affirming summary
judgment dismissal below, the court observed that under these
circumstances “the scales must be tilted in favor of the need of free
speech.”129
Though the plaintiff belonged to the group of
sellers being depicted, he could not persuasively claim that the
broadcast’s description had singled him out.130
Conversely, the rejection of the defendant’s summary
judgment motion in Clark v. American Broadcasting Companies,
Inc. illustrates the dangers to broadcasters if they fail to
painstakingly consider all potential implications of each image
presented.131 In Clark, the program focused on the effect of street
prostitution on a middle-class neighborhood, and several women
were shown as they walked down the street.132 As the plaintiff
appeared, the narrator stated that “for black women whose homes
were [in the neighborhood], the cruising white customers were an
especially humiliating experience.”133 Shortly afterward, a black
female resident of the neighborhood stated on camera: “Almost
any woman who was black and on the street was considered to
be a prostitute herself. And was treated like a prostitute.”134
Reversing the district court, the Sixth Circuit held that it was for
a jury to decide whether the plaintiff’s appearance cast her as a
next to one of the offenders. Id. at 965. According to the allegations, this error led to
the plaintiffs’ harassment and intimidation and to gunshots being fired near their
home. Id. at 965–66.
126
580 P.2d 642, 645 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978).
127
Id. at 644.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 646.
130
Id.
131
684 F.2d 1208, 1214 (6th Cir. 1982), disapproved on other grounds, Bichler v.
Union Bank & Tr. Co. of Grand Rapids, 745 F.2d 1006, 1012 (6th Cir. 1984).
132
Id. at 1210–11.
133
Id. at 1211.
134
Id.

940

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:919

neighborhood resident or as a prostitute.135 The ruling is
understandable in light of the consequences the plaintiff said she
suffered136 and the larger backdrop of racism137 from which this
episode arose. However, the district court’s ruling was at least
defensible because the plaintiff appeared after the story’s focus
had shifted from the presence of street prostitutes to their effects;
the court had grounds for finding that her appearance could only
be reasonably understood as one of the black middle-class women
who had been approached by white customers.138 Regardless,
courts should be cautious about extrapolating a holding like this
beyond its distinctive circumstances. Otherwise, producers of
television and other visual media may unduly rein in coverage lest
a jury ultimately find that a combination of words and image
produced an unintended calumny.139
This is not to suggest, of course, that solicitude for press
freedom should prompt courts to force plaintiffs to dispel all doubt
as to whether the speech at issue can be reasonably viewed as
referring to the plaintiff. Where plaintiffs have met the heavy, but

135

Id. at 1214.
Id. at 1211. Plaintiff testified that, among other things, members of her church
had shunned her and two potential employers declined to hire her out of fear that her
presence would damage their businesses. Id.
137
See Okianer Christian Dark, Incorporating Issues of Race, Gender, Class,
Sexual Orientation, and Disability into Law School Teaching, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
541, 545–48 (1996) (discussing racial implications of Clark).
138
See Clark, 684 F.2d at 1223 (Brown, J., dissenting).
139
Of course, media not presenting moving images can also encounter their own
version of this problem. The issue of permissible inferences from the juxtaposition of
word and picture in newspaper journalism is as old as Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S.
185 (1909), and as contemporary as Cheney v. Daily News L.P., 654 F. App’x 578 (3d
Cir. 2016). In Peck, the Court overturned a directed verdict against a woman who sued
over the appearance of her photograph in a newspaper advertisement. 214 U.S. at
188–90. The advertisement consisted of an endorsement by a “Mrs. A. Schuman” of
the salutary effects of malt whiskey. Id. Justice Holmes’s opinion stated that “[o]f
course” the insertion of Peck’s picture in place of Mrs. Schuman’s conveyed that Peck
had offered the testimonial. Id. In Cheney, a newspaper published on its website an
article about a sex scandal at the Philadelphia Fire Department. 654 F. App’x at 580.
Next to the article appeared a photograph of the plaintiff captioned “Philadelphia
firefighter Francis Cheney holds a flag at a 9/11 ceremony in 2006.” Id. The Third
Circuit ruled that a reader might reasonably conclude from the photograph’s presence
beside the article that Cheney was one of the firefighters implicated in the scandal.
Id. at 581; see also Prince v. Out Publ’g Inc., No. B140475, 2002 WL 7999, at *5 (Cal.
Ct. App. Jan. 3, 2002) (dismissing a claim based on photographs of plaintiff in an
article about partying, allegedly featuring unsafe sex and illegal drug use, on the
grounds that while plaintiff’s likeness in photographs was “of and concerning” him in
truthfully indicating his presence at a party and his sexual orientation, it was not “of
and concerning” him with respect to article’s references to unsafe sex and drug use).
136
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not insuperable, burden of showing that such an interpretation is
plausible, they should be permitted to pursue an otherwise
actionable claim. For example, close similarity between the name
and nature of a plaintiff’s business and those of the company
reported on can sometimes furnish a basis for sending a case
to trial. On a segment on “scams” purportedly run by some
sweepstakes companies, a television news magazine conceived of
a presumably fictional company called “Sweepstakes Clearing
House.”140 In fact, however, the plaintiff for years had been
conducting a concededly legitimate sweepstakes contest called
“Sweepstakes Clearinghouse” strongly resembling the “con”
version depicted in the story.141 The court concluded that
viewers could reasonably perceive the segment as reporting
that Sweepstakes Clearinghouse had engaged in a sweepstakes
scam.142
Similarly, a newspaper in New England Tractor-Trailer
Training of Connecticut, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co. published a
series of articles sharply critical of the “New England
Tractor-Trailer School.”143 Though the newspaper argued that its
charges had been directed at New England Tractor-Trailer
School-Massachusetts, plaintiff New England Tractor-Trailer
School-Connecticut contended that readers would understand the
charges to apply to its own operation.144 The court authorized
a trial to determine whether such an understanding was
reasonable.145

140

Allied Mktg. Grp., Inc. v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 111 S.W.3d 168, 171–72
(Tex. App. 2003).
141
Id.
142
Id. at 176.
143
New England Tractor-Trailer Training of Conn. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 480
N.E.2d 1005, 1006 (Mass. 1985). Among the accusations leveled against the school
were that the school’s trucks were “decrepit, sometimes unsafe; [the school’s
president] made a number of demonstrably false statements . . . about the school; and
that the school’s contracts with its students violate[d] the laws of at least two states.”
Id. at 1006–07 (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
144
Id. at 1007.
145
Id. at 1011. If the jury were to reach this conclusion, it would then decide
whether the newspaper had been negligent in failing to recognize that the articles
would be viewed in this light. Id. at 1012. The case is distinguishable from Nelle v.
WHO Television, LLC, 342 F. Supp. 3d 879 (S.D. Iowa 2018). There, the court granted
summary judgment for the defendant where the Nebraska plaintiff roofing company
had sued over alleged defamation concerning an Iowa company that had a partly
overlapping name but which the disputed broadcast had portrayed as operating
entirely within an Iowa city. Id. at 901.

942

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:919

Similar logic can be applied to suits by corporation presidents
where the defendant’s own statements have highlighted the
president’s dominant role. In Winn v. United Press International,
the United Press International (“UPI”) published an article
alleging fraudulent and other improper activity by a corporation
that produced beauty pageants.146
The UPI rebutted the
corporation's president’s claim that the article defamed her by
noting that the accusatory statements did not mention her by
name and related only to the alleged practices of her
corporation.147 Such a narrow reading, countered the court, was
acontextual and ignored three explicit references to the plaintiff in
other parts of the article. In two parts, the plaintiff was reported
as “denying all charges.”148 Moreover, the article described the
plaintiff as the pageant’s “director” and “executive director” while
not mentioning any other employee of the corporation.149 Taken
as a whole, then, the article could be reasonably interpreted to
refer to her.150
Similarly, in Hoffman v. Roberto, the former president of a
trucking company that had entered into bankruptcy proceedings
brought suit over a telex sent by the union’s leadership
summarizing the bankruptcy court’s reasons for appointing a
trustee for the company.151 The telex charged the company,
though not Hoffman himself, with what could be considered
improprieties.152 Denying summary judgment for the defendants,
the court determined that the telex’s audience—union locals
familiar with the company—might attribute responsibility for the
alleged actions to the plaintiff.153
In cases like these, the real possibility of reader or viewer
identification is almost intuitively apparent; in other instances,
however, suits over coverage of business activities have gone to
trial on more attenuated connections to plaintiffs. In Eyal v. Helen
146

938 F. Supp. 39, 42 (D.D.C. 1996).
Id. at 43.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 44.
150
Id. The court went on to grant summary judgment for the defendants on the
ground that the UPI had not committed negligence in reporting these charges. Id.
at 45–46.
151
85 B.R. 406, 408 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
152
Id. at 409. The court found that three of the statements cited by the plaintiff
were susceptible to a defamatory interpretation. Id. at 411.
153
Id. at 411–12. In addition, the court permitted the plaintiff to invoke group
libel theory because the company’s management—viewed as collectively accused of
misconduct—was relatively small. Id. at 412.
147
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Broadcasting Corp., the defendant radio station reported: “The
owner of a Brookline [d]elicatessen and seven other people are
arrested in connection with an international cocaine ring.”154
Though the report did not mention the plaintiff by name, he
contended as owner of Haim’s Deli that many listeners would infer
that he was operating the business as a front for cocaine dealers.155
Applying what it deemed the “objective standard” of New England
Tractor-Trailer, the court held that Eyal’s allegations potentially
showed that the station should have realized that listeners would
piece together its report with those from other sources to infer that
the report referred to Eyal.156 The court did emphasize the
modesty of the plaintiff’s burden at this early stage of the suit.
Both the complaint’s allegations and reasonable inferences from it
in Eyal’s favor were presumed true, and his complaint would be
sufficient “unless it appears beyond doubt that [Eyal] can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief.”157 Though a correct articulation of law at the time, these
propositions as applied here stand in some tension to libel
plaintiffs’ supposedly weighty burden to demonstrate that
falsehoods are “of and concerning” them. This approach invites
plaintiffs to craft tendentious and expansive allegations to stave
off dismissal. That the defendant has another opportunity to
prevail at summary judgment does not entirely remove the
incentive caused by permissive theories of plaintiff identity. The
ability of plaintiffs simply to prolong the suit provides leverage to

154

583 N.E. 2d 228, 229 (Mass. 1991) (alteration in original).
Id. at 230–31.
156
See id. at 231.
157
Id. at 230 (citations omitted). The logic of ascribing alleged company
misconduct to its president can be adapted to areas where a course of treatment has
been prominently identified with its chief proponent. In Theodosakis v. Clegg, the
defendants issued a high-profile report containing allegedly false statements
criticizing a popular recommendation for treating arthritis with certain
over-the-counter nutritional supplements. No. CV-14-02445-TUC-JAS (BPV), 2017
WL 1294529, at *1 (D. Ariz. Jan. 30, 2017). The recommendation had been included
in a number-one best-selling book by the plaintiff as part of a nine-step treatment
program. Id. The plaintiff argued that the report was “of and concerning” him because
his “name was virtually synonymous with” the supplements in question. Id. at *12.
Surviving a motion to dismiss, the complaint was ruled sufficiently pled to support a
theory that the plaintiff was so closely linked in the public mind with the use of these
supplements that the allegedly false statements impeached his personal reputation.
Id. at *13. Permitting the plaintiff to proceed at this stage does not seem troubling in
light of the level of evidence he would presumably need to marshal to prevail at
summary judgment.
155
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extract a favorable settlement. That leverage increases as the
prospect of decision by a jury—perhaps influenced by hindsight
and sympathy for the plaintiff’s distress—looms larger.
Moreover, the standard applied by the Eyal court—sustaining
a complaint unless “ ‘it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief’ ”158—recited a Supreme Court passage the Court
itself later disavowed. In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the
Court rejected this approach because it would permit “a wholly
conclusory statement of claim . . . whenever the pleadings left
open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some ‘set
of [undisclosed] facts’ to support recovery.”159 Accordingly, the
Court emphasized that courts “are not bound to accept as true a
legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”160 Instead, the
Court would assess a complaint by its “plausibility.”161 Under this
more stringent criterion, the Court would require plaintiffs to
plead sufficient facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence of” the alleged misconduct at
issue.162 Elaborating on this standard two years later, the Court
underscored the increased scrutiny applied to complaints.
Determining their sufficiency was to be a “context-specific task
that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense.”163 Thus, claims that a plaintiff unmentioned
by the defendant is the target of libel should not be upheld on the
mere possibility that evidence may later be amassed in support of
the putative link. Rather, courts should searchingly apply their
“experience and common sense” to a complaint’s assertions to
realistically decide whether the claim is truly “plausible.”
III. LIBEL THROUGH FICTION
Alleged defamation through works of fiction has proved a
fertile and vexing source of suits against authors and other
creators. The very notion that a work purporting to be nonfactual
can defame an individual raises questions of meaning with which
courts and commentators have long grappled. The issue typically
arises in the form of a plaintiff’s contention that the defendant’s
158
159
160
161
162
163

Eyal, 583 N.E. 2d at 429 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957)).
550 U.S. 544, 561 (2007) (alteration in original).
Id. at 555 (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 564.
Id. at 556.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
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work contains a thinly disguised, but libelously false, portrayal of
the plaintiff. In other instances, the defendant has given a
repellant character a name that happens to coincide with that of
the plaintiff.164 Both circumstances present the danger that jurors
will be swayed more by sympathy for a distraught plaintiff than
by the demanding criteria of the “of and concerning” requirement.
Failure by courts to guard against invalid conflation of fact and
fiction risks stifling creative expression protected and encouraged
by the First Amendment.
A.

Inherent Challenges and Varied Solutions

Though case law on defamatory fiction lacks cohesion,165 the
Restatement captures the basic prevailing philosophy:
A libel may be published of an actual person by a story or essay,
novel, play or moving picture that is intended to deal only with
fictitious characters if the characters or plot bear such a
resemblance to actual persons or events as to make it reasonable
for its readers or audience to understand that a particular
character is intended to portray that person.166

This concept is hardly self-executing, and numerous
commentators have advanced specific tests to refine the inquiry.167
164
Still other works consciously depict a particular individual but avowedly take
imaginative liberties with the person’s life. Film “biopics” are well-known examples of
this genre. See, e.g., RAGING BULL (Chartoff-Winkler Productions 1980) (relating life
of boxer Jake LaMotta); THE SOCIAL NETWORK (Columbia Pictures 2010) (portraying
founding of Facebook by Mark Zuckerberg). Rarely litigated, such works are outside
the scope of this analysis. This discussion also excludes instances in which the
disputed work places the plaintiff in an unmistakably fantastical or satirical setting.
See, e.g., Pring v. Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 442 (10th Cir. 1982) (“The test
is not whether the story is or is not characterized as ‘fiction’ . . . but whether the
charged portions in context could be reasonably understood as describing actual facts
about the plaintiff or actual events in which she participated.”). In Pring, the court
found that the plaintiff’s identity could be discerned in the defendant’s story, but
overturned the jury’s award of damages because the story could not be reasonably
understood to describe actual conduct by the plaintiff. See id. at 443 (“The charged
portions of the story described something physically impossible in an impossible
setting . . . [I]t is simply impossible to believe that a reader would not have understood
that the charged portions were pure fantasy and nothing else.”). Though the suit
foundered on the lack of factual content rather than of plaintiff identity, it still
illustrates the potential inclination of jurors to find for a sympathetic plaintiff
who has apparently suffered emotionally but has not established the legal requisites
for libel.
165
See Matthew Savare, Comment, Falsity, Fault, and Fiction: A New Standard
for Defamation in Fiction, 12 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 129, 155, 155 nn. 219–20 (2004).
166
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564 cmt. d.
167
See, e.g., Martin Garbus & Richard Kurnit, Libel Claims Based on Fiction
Should Be Lightly Dismissed, 51 BROOK. L. REV. 401, 403 (1985) (recommending as
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This diversity in approaches reflects in part the problem that
the idea of defamation by fiction on its face seems contradictory.
Whatever larger “truths” about life literature may offer, they are
contained in a vehicle that is the product of the defendant’s
imagination. Since libel claims allege that the defendant has
misrepresented the plaintiff’s reality, the charge is arguably
misdirected at a work that does not proclaim itself as presenting
reality at all. As one judge commented, “Every fiction writer
knows his creation is in some sense ‘false.’ . . . Therefore, where
fiction is the medium . . . it is meaningless to charge that the
author ‘knew’ his work was false.”168 Similarly, the charge that a
fictional character both represents and darkly deviates from the
plaintiff can have a self-defeating quality, for the plaintiff is
simultaneously arguing that the character is and is not that
person.169
Moreover, to infer from the plaintiff’s shared
characteristics with a fictional figure that the latter portrays the
former is to ignore that artists routinely draw from and transform
actual persons in the creation of their work.170 Given such

part of proposed three-pronged inquiry that a “court determine . . . whether the
plaintiff has established an identity with the fictional character and whether a
reasonable reader would attribute the defamatory aspects of that character to the
plaintiff”); Paul A. LeBel, The Infliction of Harm Through the Publication of Fiction:
Fashioning a Theory of Liability, 51 BROOK. L. REV. 281, 304–319 (1985) (setting forth
factors to be considered in determining whether a defendant should be liable for harm
caused by the publication of fiction); Mark Arnot, Note, When Is Fiction Just Fiction?
Applying Heightened Threshold Tests to Defamation in Fiction, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
1853, 1900 (2007) (“[A] work of fiction must ‘not only be reasonably read’ as stating
actual facts about the plaintiff, but must ‘also affirmatively suggest that the author
intends or endorses’ the literal reading.” (quoting Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993
F.2d 1087, 1093 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d
512, 520 (D.C. Cir. 1990))); Smirlock, supra note 97, at 521 (proposing as criteria
“unmistakability” of a statement’s reference to the plaintiff, “individuality” of
the reference, and inspiration of “conviction” in the reader that work describes
the plaintiff).
168
Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454, 461 (Cal. 1979) (Bird,
C.J., concurring).
169
See William E. Carlson, Comment, Defamation by Fiction, 42 MD. L. REV. 387,
410–11 (1983) (“A person who denies having any of his counterpart’s ‘unsavory
characteristics’ unwittingly may negate a perception that the writing describes
him. . . . A reader cannot mechanically disregard all defamatory characteristics and
identify the character based solely on the remaining nondefamatory characteristics.”
(citation omitted)).
170
See Isidore Silver, Libel, the “Higher Truths” of Art, and the First Amendment,
126 U. PA. L. REV. 1065, 1078 (1978) (“The process of artistic creation is a complex one
that often involves the creation of characters bearing some resemblance to people the
artist has known.”).
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considerations, it is not surprising that some observers have called
for extending blanket immunity from libel suits to authors and
publishers of fiction.171
Nevertheless, courts and most commentators have rejected
categorical protection for fiction. Instead, they have embraced the
position that “[r]eputations may not be traduced with
impunity . . . under the literary forms of a work of fiction.”172 The
language of “forms” appears to reflect an underlying concern that
automatic immunity for works that purport to be fictional would
supply creators means and incentive to cloak what amounts to
factual accusations in the garb of fiction.173 Thus, while a work’s
designation as fiction can inform a reasonable understanding
of whether it contains a defamatory falsehood, it is this
understanding rather than the formal label assigned that resolves
the issue.
Little judicial consensus exists, however, on means of
yielding such an understanding.
Rather, the kinds and
degrees of similarities between plaintiffs and their fictional
counterparts required to make a work actionable tend to be—
perhaps inevitably—a highly particularized determination. The
much-discussed case of Aguilar v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
illustrates the individualized and subjective nature of this
judgment.174 There, the plaintiff alleged that she had been libeled
by the portrayal of a character of “loose morals” in the film Zoot

171

See, e.g., Heidi Stam, Comment, Defamation in Fiction: The Case for Absolute
First Amendment Protection, 29 AM. U. L. REV. 571, 571 (1980); see also Robert D.
Richards, When “Ripped from the Headlines” Means “See You in Court”: Libel by
Fiction and the Tort-Law Twist on a Controversial Defamation Concept, 13 TEX. REV.
ENT. & SPORTS L. 117, 137 (2012) (proposing application of innocent-construction rule
to libel-by-fiction cases so as to bar such suits “except in the most egregious
instances”).
172
Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 65 (1920); see also, e.g., Smith v.
Stewart, 660 S.E.2d 822, 830 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (“Simply because a book is labeled
‘fiction’ does not mean that it may not be defamatory.”); Bryson v. News Am. Publ’ns,
672 N.E.2d 1207, 1221 (Ill. 1996) (“[W]e must reject the defendants’ claim that the
story cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts simply because it is
labeled fiction.” (emphasis omitted)); Allied Mktg. Grp. v. Paramount Pictures Corp.,
111 S.W.3d 168, 173 n.3 (Tx. App. 2003); Donald Meltzer, Note, Toward a New
Standard of Liability for Defamation in Fiction, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1115, 1138 (1983)
(“Certain works labeled ‘fiction’ may mirror reality so closely that a reasonable person
might consider such a work or a statement therein to be a ‘statement of fact.’ ”).
173
See SMOLLA, supra note 28, § 4:48 (“Some device is required to allow defamed
plaintiffs recompense when a work of fiction is nothing but a shield for an intentional
attack on reputation.”).
174
See 219 Cal. Rptr. 891, 893–94 (Ct. App. 1985).
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Suit.175 The movie’s story was based on the sensational Sleepy
Lagoon murder case and the riots that followed.176 According to
the complaint, the disreputable character was identified with the
plaintiff because both had the first name “Bertha,” the plaintiff
had been involved in the riots, and others believed that the
film’s “Bertha” was the plaintiff.177 Affirming a grant of summary
judgment for the defendants, the court found this evidence
“insufficient to raise a triable issue” as to whether the character
represented the plaintiff.178 The court ruled that the identity of
names could not suffice to establish that the film’s fictional Bertha
was “of and concerning” the plaintiff.179 Nor did enough other
similarities exist to support a reasonable belief that the movie
depicted the plaintiff. For example, the character was much older
than the plaintiff at the time of the Sleepy Lagoon incident, did
not physically resemble the plaintiff, and played a role in the
incident highly dissimilar to the plaintiff’s role.180 That a single
witness claimed to believe that “Bertha” was the plaintiff based on
coincidence of first names was far too meager to compensate for
these deficiencies.181
The reasoning and outcome of Aguilar appear
unexceptionable. Yet, the indeterminacy of standards in this area
would have enabled another court with different sensibilities to
reach a different conclusion and allow the suit to proceed. It would
then not be difficult to imagine a jury, moved by the plaintiff’s
account of trauma, finding that the two Berthas were one and the
same.
The potential for such a scenario can be seen in Bryson v.
News America Publications.182 In Bryson, the plaintiff sued over a
magazine short story that appeared as part of a series called “New
Voices in Fiction.”183 At one point the story’s narrator described a
classmate with the plaintiff’s last name as a “slut.”184 Both the
trial and appellate courts dismissed the plaintiff’s claim.185

175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185

Id. at 891.
Id.
Id. at 892.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 893–94.
See id. at 894–95.
672 N.E.2d 1207, 1218–19 (Ill. 1996).
Id. at 1213.
Id.
Id. at 1212.
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Reversing, the Illinois Supreme Court emphasized that the story
took place in southern Illinois, home to both the plaintiff and
author, that the plaintiff alleged that the character shared about
two-dozen physical features and experiences with the plaintiff,
and, especially, that the character bore the uncommon name
Bryson.186 Given these similarities, the court allowed the plaintiff
a chance to prove that the character bore “such a close
resemblance to the plaintiff that reasonable persons would
understand that the character was actually intended to portray
the plaintiff.”187
Decisions like Bryson must give pause to authors who draw
elements of their characters—even inadvertently—from actual
individuals. The sheer unpredictability of courts’ disposition of
libel claims over such works is illustrated by the Illinois Supreme
Court’s reversal of two prior rulings against the plaintiff’s claim.188
Moreover, the court effectively found that the plaintiff had cleared
two substantial hurdles, which in combination should have
demanded a powerful showing by the plaintiff. First is the heavy
burden placed on all plaintiffs who contend that fictional
characters amount to portrayals of themselves.189 Additionally, a
claim drawn from a reference allegedly to the plaintiff as a “slut”
must overcome authority that epithets and pejorative terms in and
of themselves do not ordinarily constitute actionable factual
accusations.190 In Bryson, the story’s narrator states in the
offending passage: “Who knows what guys like that made Bryson
do. . . . I remembered what a slut she was and forgot about the
sorriness I’d been holding onto for her.”191 While the court
reasoned that the first of these sentences placed a specific gloss on

186

See id. at 1219.
Id.
188
Id. at 1225.
189
See Springer v. Viking Press, 90 A.D.2d 315, 320 (1st Dep’t 1982), aff’d, 60
N.Y.2d 916 (1983); Carter-Clark v. Random House, Inc., 196 Misc. 2d 1011, 1013 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2003), aff’d, 17 A.D.3d 241 (1st Dep’t 2005); R. Bruce Rich & Livia D.
Brilliant, Defamation-in-Fiction: The Limited Viability of Alternative Causes of Action,
52 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (1986); Bettina M. Chin, Note, Regulating Your Second
Life: Defamation in Virtual Worlds, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 1303, 1336 (2007) (describing
requirement as “quite strict”).
190
See Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418
U.S. 264, 285–86 (1974) (finding “scab” to be “merely rhetorical hyperbole”); Greenbelt
Coop. Publ’g Ass’n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13–14 (1970) (noting that “blackmail”
“was no more than rhetorical hyperbole”).
191
Bryson, 672 N.E.2d at 1213.
187
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the second,192 speculation that does not imply the speaker’s
personal knowledge of a defamatory fact is ordinarily protected.193
Nevertheless, the court approved a claim based on “an opinion
uttered by a fictional character about another fictional character”
in a brief episode of a story portraying adolescent life.194 The range
of possible libel actions based on this attenuated chain of logic
would appear limitless.195
Such an approach also threatens to inhibit the creation of
“faction” in which actual figures appear in an invented
narrative.196 A staple of books,197 film,198 and television,199 such
works could be made vulnerable to suits by living individuals
portrayed in them under Bryson’s mode of analysis. Obviously, a
producer of fiction can argue that the portrayal of a person’s
behavior can only be understood as an imagined course of conduct
in the setting of a fictional work. Indeed, Isidore Silver has
deemed it “error to assume that, because a work of faction
impresses one as somewhat ‘historical’ or ‘realistic,’ it is any less
fictional than the purest fantasy or romance.”200 In Bryson,
however, the court disparaged the notion that a “fictional label”
could be relied upon to deflect readers’ inclination to equate a
fictional character with the plaintiff.201

192

See id. at 1217.
See Gray v. St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 221 F.3d 243, 250 (1st Cir. 2000); Levin v.
McPhee, 119 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 1997); Partington v. Bugliosi, 56 F.3d 1147, 1156
(9th Cir. 1995).
194
Bryson, 672 N.E.2d at 1228 (McMorrow, J., dissenting) (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted).
195
See ROBIN HEMLEY, TURNING LIFE INTO FICTION 173 (2006); Savare, supra
note 165, at 143 n.125 (“The holding in Bryson puts at risk almost any writer of fiction
who has had a real experience in this world. It expands the possible universe of
plaintiffs to those who have merely crossed paths with a writer.” (quoting Sandra
Baron in telephone interview)); Wes Smith, Libel in Fiction? Trial Will Tell Story, CHI.
TRIB. (Nov. 17, 1996), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1996-11-179611170256-story.html.
196
See Faction, n.2, OXFORD ENG. DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2014). See generally Silver,
supra note 170, at 1067.
197
See, e.g., TRUMAN CAPOTE, IN COLD BLOOD: A TRUE ACCOUNT OF A MULTIPLE
MURDER AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (Vintage Int’l ed. 2012); NORMAN MAILER, THE
EXECUTIONER’S SONG (First Grand Cent. Pub. Trade ed. 2012); TOM WOLFE, THE
ELECTRIC KOOL-AID ACID TEST (1968).
198
See, e.g., ALL THE PRESIDENT’S MEN (Warner Bros. 1976); CHARLIE WILSON’S
WAR (Universal Pictures 2007).
199
See, e.g., Narcos (Netflix, Aug. 28, 2015–Sept. 1, 2017); When We Rise (ABC
television broadcast, Feb. 27, 2017–Mar. 3, 2017).
200
See Silver, supra note 170, at 1086.
201
See Bryson v. News Am. Publ’ns, Inc., 672 N.E.2d 1207, 1219 (Ill. 1996).
193
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Again, the court reached this conclusion where a private
individual complained of a passing remark by a fictional narrator
about a fictional character in an imagined story. Presumably the
“fictional label” would carry even less weight where the plaintiff
recognizably appears in the work at issue. Under Bryson’s lax
standard, such an individual might readily survive the defendant’s
motion to dismiss. That the defendant would then still have the
opportunity to persuade the jury not to equate the plaintiff and the
plaintiff’s factional namesake does not obviate the need for a
higher bar at an earlier stage. In addition to concerns already
expressed202—including costs203—about leaving issues of plaintiff
identification to juries, those concerns increase in this forum.
The job of distinguishing libelous charge from imaginative liberty
under the First Amendment may prove especially challenging
to jurors.
In this respect, the experience of juries’ application of the
actual malice standard may be instructive. One study found that
about two-thirds of trial verdicts against media defendants were
reversed where the appellate court ruled specifically on the issue
of actual malice.204 In light of such data, and of a well-known
report on a jury’s struggle to apply the standard in a high-profile
case,205 one scholar concluded that “juries are confused by the
complexities of Sullivan’s categorical, constitutional rules.”206 If
so, juries may find application of the “of and concerning”
requirement to faction even more baffling than the concept of
actual malice. With actual malice, jurors are asked to gauge the
level of intent with which a plaintiff uttered a defamatory
falsehood. However difficult that inquiry, it is conceptually more
focused than determining whether the version of the plaintiff who
appears in a work of fiction is “really” that individual. The latter
calls for sophistication in assessing a range of evidence bearing on
the place of the plaintiff in the disputed work and in the world.
Moreover, just as bias is thought to account in part for libel
202

See supra notes 90–95 and accompanying text.
Susan Gilles has pointed out that a large portion of a defendant’s costs in a
libel suit have already been incurred before the summary judgment stage. See Gilles,
supra note 31, at 1780–81.
204
Id. at 1778.
205
See Stephen Brill, Inside the Jury Room at the Washington Post Libel Trial,
AM. LAW., Nov. 1982, at 1, 94, cited in Susanna Frederick Fischer, Rethinking
Sullivan: New Approaches in Australia, New Zealand, and England, 34 GEO. WASH.
INT’L L. REV. 101, 187 (2002).
206
Fischer, supra note 31, at 187.
203
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verdicts against media defendants in cases that hinge on actual
malice,207 some jurors may be influenced by emotion rather than
by analytical abstractions in drawing conclusions about faction.
The shame or anger displayed by the plaintiff may hold more sway
than nuances of literary theory or a fine calculation of the overlap
between the plaintiff’s actual and fictional lives.208
In a sense, then, faction represents in heightened form the
uncertainty over legal treatment of fiction generally that can exert
a chilling effect on authors and publishers. Confronted with
indeterminate standards and unpredictable juries, they “simply
cannot tell which aspects of a portrayal will be considered
significant in comparing plaintiffs and characters.”209 This specter
may intimidate them into rendering characters in less vivid hues
or forego certain works altogether. Nor can this impact be
measured; the amount of work diluted or halted for fear of a libel
action by its nature tends to be untraceable. Even authors and
other creators who justifiably expect to be vindicated cannot
forecast the costs they will incur to defeat a suit. With judges
reluctant to intrude on the jury’s role and jurors susceptible to
misapplication of First Amendment doctrine, libel defendants may
have to absorb the large expenses generated on the long road from
initial complaint to successful appeal.
B. Chronic Inconsistencies
It would be unrealistic to demand precise uniformity of
treatment and result for a problem as variegated and
multijurisdictional as libel through fiction.
Nevertheless,
divergences among courts have produced an unpredictability that

207
See Gilles, supra note 31, at 1794–95; Tigran W. Eldred, Note, Amplifying Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Union: The Proper Scope of De Novo Appellate Review in Public
Person Defamation Cases, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 579, 588–89 (1989). At this time, it is
speculative but plausible to think that various public accusations of “fake news” may
come to contribute to jurors’ attitudes in such cases. See e.g., Jeremy W. Peters,
Wielding Claims of ‘Fake News,’ Conservatives Take Aim at Mainstream Media, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 26, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/ 12/25/us/politics/fake-newsclaims-conservatives-mainstream-media-.html; John Hayward, Sean Hannity: People
Don’t Need ‘Fake News’ Corporate Media Anymore; Landscape Shifting to Breitbart,
Drudge, Talk Radio, BREITBART (Nov. 28, 2016), https://www.breitbart.com/radio/
2016/11/28/sean-hannity-people-dont-need-fake-news-shifting-breitbart-drudge-talkradio/.
208
Another kind of potential bias is the temptation for jurors to align their votes
with their publicly espoused values. See Silver, supra note 170, at 1082–83. (“[J]uries
may well find liability for works they publicly abhor but secretly enjoy.”).
209
Smirlock, supra note 97, at 531.
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is disturbing even under a far more indulgent expectation.
Creators of fictional characters and those who disseminate their
works cannot reliably anticipate whether a self-proclaimed
real-life counterpart will haul them into court or how much weight
that court will assign to First Amendment values. As one
commentator pointedly observed, defendants “cannot tell whether
a fictional description’s ‘ugliness’ serves to preclude identification
or whether it constitutes false and libelous matter. They will be
unsure whether even their best efforts will shield them from libel,
or whether a mere disclaimer will suffice.”210 And if judges—
presumably familiar with legal authority and precedent—adopt
such diverse approaches, then the caprices of individual juries
must be all the more treacherous.211
As the reference to disclaimers above suggests, courts differ
widely even on the fundamental question of how much a work’s
representation as fiction should shape their analysis. As noted
earlier, the court in Bryson was almost disdainful of the idea that
a work’s designation as fiction should influence its determination
even in view of the plaintiff’s tangential connection to a short
story’s character.212 Nor was the Illinois court isolated in this
attitude. In Muzikowski v. Paramount Pictures Corp., the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals expressly looked to Bryson for guidance
in finding that a story’s assertion that it does not mean to describe
any real person “does not mean that it may not be defamatory per
se.”213 The film that provoked Robert Muzikowski’s suit had stated
in its credits, “While this motion picture is in part inspired by
actual events, persons and organizations, this is a fictitious story
and no actual persons, events or organizations have been
portrayed.”214 While Muzikowski had become well-known for
coaching Little League Baseball teams in struggling areas of
Chicago, the film included no character named “Robert” or
“Muzikowski” or any references to Little League Baseball.215
Moreover, the character whose criminal behavior formed the basis
of the suit differed from Muzikowski in significant ways. For

210

Id.
See Savare, supra note 165, at 156.
212
See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
213
322 F.3d 918, 925 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Bryson v. News Am. Publ’ns, Inc., 672
N.E.2d 1207, 1219 (Ill. 1996)).
214
Id. at 922.
215
See id. at 921–22. Muzikowski’s alleged fictional counterpart, however, did
coach an inner-city baseball league. See id. at 926.
211
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example, the character copes with a gambling addiction216 and
“never breaks his drinking habit.”217 Neither the disclaimer nor
these differences sufficed to halt the suit. Overturning the district
court’s order to dismiss, the Seventh Circuit gave the plaintiff the
opportunity to show that no innocent construction of the
character’s portrayal was reasonably possible.218
At the same time, other courts appear to treat a work’s
designation as fiction as creating an overwhelming presumption
that it does not portray the plaintiff. In Middlebrooks v. Curtis
Publishing Co., the plaintiff could point to considerable overlap
between his circumstances and those of a short story’s character
as well as to numerous witnesses who testified that they believed
the character represented the plaintiff.219 The court nevertheless
dismissed the suit, emphasizing that the story “was an obvious
work of fiction. It was listed in the fiction section of the
[magazine’s] index, was labeled fiction, and was illustrated by
cartoons.”220 In a similar vein, the court in Smith v. Huntington
Publishing Co. acknowledged that a news story focusing on a
troubled individual assigned a fictitious name also described in
notable ways the plaintiff who happened to have the same name.221
Despite the similarity of struggles and identity of names, however,
the court granted summary judgment for the defendant.222 To the
court, any reasonable belief that the article reported on the
plaintiff was dispelled by the “clear statement by the author in
boldface print that the names were fictitious.”223
In Aguilar as well, the court’s grant of summary judgment for
the defendant highlighted at the outset of its analysis: “Mere
Identity or Similarity of Names Is Insufficient to Prove a Work of
216

Id. at 926.
Id. at 922.
218
Id. at 927. The presence of disclaimers in Greene v. Paramount Pictures Corp.,
138 F. Supp. 3d 226 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), similarly failed to halt a claim. The closing
credits of the film The Wolf of Wall Street announced that some of its characters were
composites of actual individuals depicted in the memoir on which the movie was based
and that “any similarity . . . to the actual character or history of any person . . . is
entirely for dramatic purposes and not intended to reflect on an actual character,
history, product or entity.” Id. at 230. Nevertheless, the plaintiff was allowed to
proceed with his contention that one of the film’s characters falsely portrayed him as
“as a criminal, drug user, degenerate, depraved, and/or devoid of any morality or
ethics.” Id. at 230–31.
219
413 F.2d 141, 142 (4th Cir. 1969).
220
Id. at 143.
221
410 F. Supp. 1270, 1272–73 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
222
Id. at 1274.
223
Id.
217
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Fiction Is Of and Concerning a Real Person.”224 This principle also
defeated the claim in Landau v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems,
Inc., where the door panel of a gambler’s office, briefly shown in a
television crime drama, bore the same name as the plaintiff’s
business.225 For the court, the nature of the program was decisive:
“The script from which the performance was dramatized was
wholly fictional. The plot, settings, characters and dialogue
were entirely the product of imagination.”226 Even a series of
advertisements by a company mocking a fictional corporation that
used terminology associated with a rival was protected by
their fictional nature.227 As the court summarized, “[T]he only
reasonable inference to be drawn from these advertisements
is that Sid’s Waste Water Treatment Emporium is a purely
fictional enterprise.”228
Another area of uncertainty for creators whose characters
resemble actual individuals is the role a court will assign to their
presumed intent. Notwithstanding the oft-quoted doctrine that it
“is not so much who was aimed at as who was hit,”229 courts are
often influenced by their perception of whether an author meant
to present a thinly veiled portrait of the plaintiff. In Fetler,230 for
example, the plaintiff’s suit was bolstered by his asseveration that
the novel’s author—“his brother told him that the book, which he
was then writing, ‘was about our father, the family concerts and
me.’ ”231 Conversely, the court in Aguilar232 found significant to its
grant of summary judgment for the defendant “the uncontradicted
testimony of the author . . . [that] he had never heard of Ms.

224
Aguilar v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 219 Cal. Rptr. 891, 892 (Ct. App.
1985) (capitalization and italics in original); see also supra notes 174–181 and
accompanying text.
225
205 Misc. 357, 359 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 1954).
226
Id. at 360.
227
See Zerpol Corp. v. DMP Corp., 561 F. Supp. 404, 413–14 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
228
Id. at 414–15.
229
Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 64 (1920). As the court elaborated,
a publisher “is chargeable with the publication of the libelous matter if it was spoken
‘of and concerning’ [the plaintiff], even though it was unaware of his existence, or that
it was written ‘of and concerning’ any existing person.” Id. at 63.
230
Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1966). See supra notes
103–108 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
231
Fetler, 364 F.2d at 651.
232
Aguilar v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 219 Cal. Rptr. 891 (Ct. App. 1985). See
supra notes 174–181 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
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Aguilar” before his work was written.233 Similarly, in Clare,234 the
court repeatedly emphasized the defendant’s intent to write a
fictional story,235 finally ruling against the plaintiff on the ground
that the defendant “did not intend to write the book of plaintiff or
intend to appropriate plaintiff’s name to the story.”236 In Landau,
too, the court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s suit assigned importance
to the absence of any “attempt by the defendants . . . to create any
other impression” than for the play at issue to recount “an
imaginary event involving fictional characters.”237
Yet other courts have declared the defendant’s intent simply
irrelevant to its analysis. In Allied Marketing Group, Inc. v.
Paramount Pictures Corp., the court’s acknowledgement that the
defendant “intended to use a fictional company name” that turned
out to coincide with the plaintiff’s did not invalidate the plaintiff’s
claim.238 Rather, because the viewer’s reasonable understanding
controlled, “it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant intended to refer to the plaintiff.”239 Sustaining a
verdict against the defendant in Davis v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures,
Inc.,240 the court there likewise stated: “If the communication is
reasonably understood by the person to whom it is made as
intended to refer to the plaintiff, it is immaterial that the defamer
did not intend to refer to him.”241 Other courts have recited this
principle even as they have ultimately ruled against the plaintiff.
In Smith v. Huntington Publishing Co., for example, the court
granted summary judgment to the defendant after noting that
“[t]he test is [not] the intent of the author . . . . The test is whether
a reasonable person could reasonably believe that the article
referred to the plaintiff.” 242
233

Aguilar, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 894–95.
Clare v. Farrell, 70 F. Supp. 276 (D. Minn. 1947). See supra notes 58–63 and
accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
235
See Clare, 70 F. Supp. at 277–79.
236
Id. at 278.
237
Landau v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 205 Misc. 357, 360, 362 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
Cnty. 1954); cf. Tamkin v. CBS Broad., Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 264, 266–68 (Ct. App.
2011) (dismissing under California statute a libel suit by real estate agents whose
names were used as placeholders in the preliminary script of a television episode
where the defendants did not intend for the script to be disseminated on the Internet).
238
111 S.W.3d 168, 171 (Tex. App. 2003). See supra notes 140–142 and
accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
239
Allied Mktg. Grp., Inc., 111 S.W.3d at 173.
240
191 F.2d 901, 905 (8th Cir. 1951). See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying
text for a discussion of this case.
241
Davis, 191 F.2d at 904 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
242
410 F. Supp. 1270, 1273 (S.D. Ohio 1975).
234
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Implicit in these and other suits based on fiction is the
unpredictability of what a court or jury will consider the “sweet
spot” between a character’s resembling a plaintiff so closely as to
meet the “of and concerning” requirement and departing so
harshly as to support the charge of libel. As suggested earlier,243
the problem here is less inconsistency than the intrinsic
impossibility of constructing a reliable guide to the degree of
resemblance that will trigger actionability. A notable example is
the role that physical similarities or dissimilarities will play in a
court’s calculus. In Tamkin v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc., for
example, the court in dismissing the suit noted that “there is
nothing about the physical description of the fictional Scott
Tamkin, such as a special birthmark or a specific fashion accessory
or hairstyle” that would support a reasonable inference that he
represented the actual Scott Tamkin.244 In Bindrim v. Mitchell, by
contrast, the court brushed aside the lengths to which a novel’s
author went to distinguish her main character’s appearance from
that of the plaintiff who inspired the work.245
IV. THE PROBLEM OF GROUP DEFAMATION
Another frequent source of claims that plaintiffs have suffered
de facto defamation by inference is group defamation doctrine. In
suits based on fiction, the question is whether a purportedly
imagined character effectively—but falsely—portrays the
plaintiff. Where issues of group defamation arise, by contrast, no
one doubts that the defendant has described real people. Rather,
the plaintiff must demonstrate that an allegedly defamatory
statement about an aggregate body of persons refers specifically to
the plaintiff.246 The Restatement articulates a widely followed
standard for determining when a plaintiff may prevail on such
a claim.
One who publishes defamatory matter concerning a group or
class of persons is subject to liability to an individual member of
it if, but only if,

243

See supra notes 166–167 and accompanying text.
122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 264, 274 (Ct. App. 2011).
245
155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 37 (Ct. App. 1979).
246
See Bezons v. Nelson, 155 N.W.2d 241, 243 (Mich. Ct. App. 1967) (“[I]f
defamatory words are used broadly in respect to a class or group, there is no cause of
action unless the words can be made to apply to a single member of that group or to
every member of the group.” (citations omitted)).
244
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(a) the group or class is so small that the matter can
reasonably be understood to refer to the member,
or
(b) the circumstances of publication reasonably give rise to
the conclusion that there is particular reference to the
member.247

A group of more than twenty-five members is presumptively too
large to support a libel claim by one of its individual members.248
Though this rule of thumb is defensible,249 it still leaves ample
scope for divergent judicial interpretation and jury bias below the
twenty-five-member threshold. As with fiction, then, group libel
suits should contain heightened safeguards against the abuse of
claims based on defamation by inference.
A.

Principles, Rationales, and Standards

Notwithstanding variations in analysis, courts generally
agree on a handful of principles governing group defamation
claims. In evaluating a small group defamation claim, a court
takes into account the group’s size, the portion of the group that
has been defamed, and “the prominence of the group and its
individual members” within the area where the defamatory charge
is disseminated.250 Thus, where a statement defames an entire
small group, individual members of the group can readily show
that the statement referred to them.251 On the other hand, a
member of a defamed organization has the burden of showing that
“that person is distinguished from other members of the group.”252

247

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A.
See Peterson v. Sanghi, No. 8-18-cv-020000-JLS-ADS, 2019 WL 1715487, at *6
(C.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2019); Blatty v. N.Y. Times Co., 728 P.2d 1177, 1185 (Cal. 1986);
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 750 (4th ed. 1971);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. b.
249
See Nat Stern, The Certainty Principle as Justification for the Group
Defamation Rule, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 951, 969 (2008).
250
Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 84 A.D.2d 226, 239 (2d Dep’t 1981).
251
See id. at 231.
252
Three Amigos SJL Rest., Inc. v. CBS News, Inc., 132 A.D.3d 82, 88 (1st Dep’t
2015); see also Yow v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1188 (E.D. Cal. 2008)
(“ ‘[I]f the group is small and its members easily ascertainable, [the] plainiff[] may
succeed,’ on an individual action based on the defamatory matter being directed at the
group.” (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Blatty, 728 P.2d at 1885)).
248
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Similar to the notion of “prominence,” courts consider group libel
claims from the perspective of the average informed253 and
reasonable254 reader.
Undergirding the group defamation rule is the idea that
libelous statements about large groups offers too attenuated a link
with any single member to support a claim of individual harm. In
the words of one court, “[T]he larger the collectivity named in the
libel, the less likely it is that a reader would understand it to refer
to a particular individual.”255
Even where such sweeping
generalizations are taken at face value, audiences are unlikely to
find them credible.256 Moreover, the availability of suits by
individual members could trigger multiple, potentially prohibitive,
claims.257 This prospect has especially troubling potential to
dampen free public discussion.258 Conversely, the ability to bring
253

See Excellus Health Plan, Inc. v. Tran, 287 F. Supp. 2d 167, 174 (W.D.N.Y.
2003) (upholding suit where underlying facts connecting medical practice group to
defamed individual physicians were “known to those who read or heard the
publication”); Gonzalez v. Sessom, 137 P.3d 1245, 1248 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006) (noting
article’s reference to plaintiff to be “measured by its natural and probable effect upon
the mind of the average lay reader” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted));
Marr v. Putnam, 246 P.2d 509, 521 (Or. 1952) (permitting claim because “persons with
a knowledge of the circumstances” could have understood article as referring to
plaintiffs); Harvest House Publishers. v. Local Church, 190 S.W.3d 204, 214 (Tex. App.
2006) (repeatedly describing relevant perspective as that of the “reasonable reader”).
254
See AIDS Counseling & Testing Ctrs. v. Group W Television, Inc., 903 F.2d
1000, 1005 (4th Cir. 1990) (interpreting publication “in the sense in which hearers or
readers of common and reasonable understanding would ascribe to [it]” (alteration in
original) (internal citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Harvest House
Publishers, 190 S.W.3d at 214 (conducting objective inquiry of what “the hypothetical
reasonable reader” would believe).
255
Brady, 84 A.D.2d at 228; see also Jankovic v. Int’l Crisis Grp., 494 F.3d 1080,
1089–90 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
256
See Barger v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1151, 1153 (N.D. Cal. 1983)
(Courts are inclined to “presume that no reasonable reader would take the statements
[about a large class of people] as literally applying to each individual member.”), aff’d,
732 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1984); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS § 18.6, at 489 (1999)
“[M]ost people have already formed their baseline opinions about large groups of
individuals and are, therefore, unlikely to be swayed by general denunciations that
run counter to their own opinions.”).
257
See Mich. United Conservation Clubs v. CBS News, 485 F. Supp. 893, 900
(W.D. Mich. 1980) (expressing concern that permitting claims by members of large
group “could invite any number of vexatious lawsuits”), aff’d, 665 F.2d 110 (6th Cir.
1981); Ellyn Tracy Marcus, Comment, Group Defamation and Individual Actions:
A New Look at an Old Rule, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1532, 1555 (1983) (“[A] multiplicity of
actions could expose defendants to liability severely out of proportion to the harm the
speakers have actually inflicted.”).
258
See Art of Living Found. v. Does, No. 10–CV–05022–LHK., 2011 WL 2441898,
at *6 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2011) (“The rationale for [the group libel] rule is to protect
freedom of public discussion . . . .”); Brady, 84 A.D.2d at 229 (stating the group
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suit when a statement tars a small group embodies the judgment
that readers or auditors will probably connect the collective libel
to each member.259
The presumptive immunity of statements about groups of
more than twenty-five members represents the principal effort to
bring some predictability to an inherently inexact analysis. The
operation of this principle was famously illustrated by the
influential ruling in Neiman-Marcus v. Lait.260 There, a book had
asserted that most of the salesmen at Neiman-Marcus’s Dallas
store were “fairies” and that some of the salesgirls were “call
girls.”261 The court allowed a suit by fifteen of the store’s
twenty-five salesmen,262 but dismissed an action by 30 of 382
saleswomen on the “widely accepted” ground that “[w]here the
group or class libelled is large, none can sue even though the
language used is inclusive.”263 Though the twenty-five member
limit for actionability does not constitute a hard ceiling,264 it
appears to offer more space for uninhibited speech than
application of multiple factors to particular cases.
Nevertheless, a number of courts have rejected “slavish
reliance upon the general rule which relies upon numbers alone”265
and adopted a multi-factor approach. The most prominent
multifactor method examines “the intensity of the suspicion cast

defamation rule is “designed to encourage frank discussions of matters of public
concern under the First Amendment guarantees”).
259
See Note, Developments in the Law Defamation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875, 894
(1956) (“Where the group is small there is a great likelihood that others will
understand that the defendant intended to attribute certain qualities, beliefs, or acts
to each member.”); EPSTEIN, supra note 256, § 18.6, at 490 (pointing to the “rough
empirical judgment . . . that the more focused the attack, the greater the potential
reputational harm”).
260
13 F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
261
Id. at 313.
262
Id. at 316–17. The court took for granted that an accusation of homosexuality
was libelous per se. This premise has since been questioned in light of advancing social
and cultural norms. See generally Holly Miller, Homosexuality as Defamation: A
Proposal for the Use of the “Right-Thinking Minds” Approach in the Development of
Modern Jurisprudence, 18 COMM. L. & POL’Y 349 (2013); Anthony Michael Kreis,
Lawrence Meets Libel: Squaring Constitutional Norms with Sexual-Orientation
Defamation, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 125 (2012).
263
Neiman-Marcus, 13 F.R.D. at 315 (citations omitted); see also id. at 316
(stating that no reasonable person would “conclude from the publication a reference
to any individual saleswoman.” (citations omitted)).
264
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A cmt. b (stating that “[i]t is not
possible to set definite limits as to the size of the group or class” above which a libelous
generalization cannot be considered of and concerning an individual member).
265
McCullough v. Cities Serv. Co., 676 P.2d 833, 836 (Okla. 1984).
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upon the plaintiff”266 by the defendant’s collective libel.267 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted this test in a case ignited by an
article appearing to charge “[University of] Oklahoma players”
with taking amphetamines.268 In upholding a directed verdict for
the plaintiff, who was not one of the team’s stars,269 the court
refused to find decisive that the team comprised sixty to seventy
players. Rather, under circumstances like these, “even a general
derogatory reference to a group does affect the reputation of every
member” and liability can attach where the suspicion placed on
the plaintiff is sufficiently intense.270 In a case widely followed in
New York, a court there based its adoption of the “intensity of
suspicion test” on the premise that “[a]n absolute limit on size”
was “unduly restrictive” and “arbitrary.”271 While acknowledging
that size was relevant, the court set forth a number of other
factors to be considered when determining whether defamation of
a group brought a member into disrepute.272 Applying this
analysis, the court authorized a suit by twenty-seven of a city
police department’s fifty-three officers over a suggestion that
they had been accessories to misconduct by eighteen indicted
fellow officers.273
While the Restatement’s position retains considerable
ambiguity when applied to groups with twenty-five members or
fewer, the “intensity of suspicion” test raises far more uncertainty.
Though the test has found favor with some commentators,274 its

266

Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc. v. Morris, 377 P.2d 42, 52 (Okla. 1962) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Note, Liability for Defamation of a Group, 34
Colum. L. Rev. 1322, 1325 (1934)).
267
Commentators have also proposed standards that weigh specific factors. See,
e.g., Jeffrey S. Bromme, Note, Group Defamation: Five Guiding Factors, 64 TEX. L.
REV. 591, 608 (1985); Marcus, supra note 257, at 1552.
268
Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 377 P.2d at 47.
269
He was a fullback on the alternate squad who had played in nine of the team’s
eleven games. Id. at 47, 52.
270
Id. at 52 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Note, supra note 266,
at 1324–25).
271
Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 84 A.D.2d 226, 234–37 (2d Dep’t 1981).
See infra notes 324–327 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
272
Brady, 84 A.D.2d at 236–37 (citing Note, supra note 266, at 1326).
273
Id. at 236–37, 240–41.
274
See, e.g., LAURENCE H. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION § 10, at 57–58
(1978) (describing Fawcett as a potential “landmark in the American law”); Bromme,
supra note 267, at 597; David A. Elder, “Hostile Environment” Charges and the
ABA/AALS Accreditation/Membership Imbroglio, Post-Modernism’s “No Country for
Old Men”: Why Defamed Law Professors Should “Not Go Gentle Into that Good Night,”
6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 434, 495–96, 504–05 (2009); Mason C. Lewis, The
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free-floating, ad hoc approach leaves a broad spectrum of
expression potentially exposed to liability. The case in which the
test originated illustrates its lack of guidance. The court intuited
that the plaintiff, though a part-time player, would “not be
overlooked by those who were familiar with the team.”275 It is far
from evident how later courts—and later speakers—could draw on
this pivotal observation to determine the permissible boundaries
of comments about large groups. Moreover, a New York court
noted that the balancing factors it enumerated were “not meant to
be exclusive.”276 Thus, not only do speakers under this approach
lack the assurance that comments about groups of over twenty-five
members carry a strong presumption of immunity, they also
cannot anticipate what factors will ultimately be deemed relevant.
The standard’s vagueness inhibits speech in another way as well.
Because of its extreme malleability, a court is less positioned to
pronounce a given statement protected as a matter of law.
Accordingly, a defendant is more likely to be subjected to the
vagaries of jury predilections with which this Article is concerned.
B. Difficulties of Application
A brief survey of cases involving group defamation claims
suggests their potential to inhibit even good-faith generalizations
about a collection of individuals. Admittedly, courts on the whole
have not lightly permitted group libel claims to proceed. Still,
disparate treatment of similar claims, authorization of dubious
suits, and the murky line between insufficient and permissible
claims point to the value of erecting a higher threshold for
such actions.
In addressing group defamation claims, courts have generally
required more than the literal or theoretical possibility that a
defendant’s collective characterization specifically targeted the
plaintiff. In Riverhouse Publishing Co. v. Porter, the defendant
had published a column describing the problem of “phony award
schemes.”277 Though the column contained a phrase included in
the title of the plaintiff’s biographical encyclopedia, the court held
that the column could not be construed as referring to the plaintiff

Individual Member’s Right to Recover for a Defamation Leveled at the Group, 17 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 519, 536 (1963).
275
Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 377 P.2d at 52.
276
Brady, 84 A.D.2d at 236.
277
287 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.R.I. 1968).
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or any other individual publisher.278 The complaint, asserted the
court, “cannot make the plaintiff’s identity certain which is
otherwise uncertain.”279
Applying this type of reasoning, a court found that a circular
raising doubts about the reliability of a certain kind of insurance
company could not reasonably be understood as directed at a
company of that nature: “If the circular carries any libelous
imputation, it is defamatory of a class and not of plaintiff as a
member of that class.”280 Similarly, the court in Board of Forensic
Document Examiners, Inc. v. American Bar Association dismissed
a suit by seven document forensic examiners over the defendant’s
assertion that examiners who had not met certain standards had
not received appropriate training.281 For the court, the statement’s
application to many others besides the plaintiffs282 removed it from
the reach of small group libel doctrine.283
In other instances, the very generality of defendants’
statements has immunized them from suit. Granger v. Time, Inc.
involved an article asserting that in one city “[a]rson has become
common as people who are unable to sell their devalued buildings
burn them for the insurance.”284 Given the large number of
relevant fires, 481, and owners, 204, the court ruled that the
statement could not be reasonably construed as specifically
charging the two plaintiff owners with arson.285 Likewise, a book’s
broad critical statements about managers of collateralized debt
obligations were held insufficient to support an action by a
manager on whom a chapter of the book had focused.286 Nor did a
news report’s statement that an establishment was “run by the

278

Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 5.
280
Hosp. Care Corp. v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 9 S.E.2d 796, 800 (S.C. 1940).
281
287 F. Supp. 3d 726, 734 (N.D. Ill. 2018).
282
In addition, five other individuals had also been certified under the plaintiff
board’s putatively inadequate standards. See id.
283
See id.
284
Granger v. Time, Inc., 578 P.2d 535, 537 (Mont. 1977).
285
See id. at 539–40.
286
See Chau v. Lewis, 935 F. Supp. 2d 644, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 771 F.3d
118, 121 (2d Cir. 2014). See also Sims v. Kiro, Inc., 580 P.2d 642, 647 (Wash. Ct. App.
1978), discussed at supra notes 126–130 and accompanying text, which offers a
comparable rejection of a claim by a member of the class whom the defendant had
disparaged.
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mafia” furnish grounds for suit where no individuals were named
and the plaintiffs included two entities that provided service to the
establishment and three of their employees.287
Indeed, even where plaintiffs constitute a small group of
identifiable individuals, courts have often dismissed the suit for
failure to demonstrate that the audience would have drawn that
connection from the communication in question. For example, in
Lazore v. NYP Holdings, Inc., a newspaper editorial critical of a
Mohawk tribe’s attempt to build a casino asserted that the tribe
“amounts to a criminal enterprise.”288 The three chiefs of the
Mohawk Tribal Council, the tribe’s ruling body, persuaded the
trial court that their coordination of the casino project and the
editorial’s supporting examples of illegal behavior by “the tribe,”
“tribal members,” or “Mohawks” pointed to the chiefs individually
as the operators of this “criminal enterprise.”289 Reversing,
the appellate court concluded that “the offending statements
were directed against a governing body and how it
governed[;] . . . there were no statements that the Tribal Council
members were individually corrupt or individually promoting a
criminal enterprise.”290
In a recent case, a manufacturer of helicopter helmets had
warned of the inadequacies and dangers of helmets produced by
certain unidentified companies.291 Two rival companies contended
that the nation’s small number of helicopter helmet
manufacturers meant that the warning would inevitably be
understood as referring to one of them.292 Noting that none of the
warnings mentioned the plaintiffs, however, the court found this
link implausible and dismissed the complaint.293 Employing
similar logic, a court rejected a claim by law enforcement officials
who had been involved in the arrest of a major drug trafficker.294
The article in question had repeated the trafficker’s claim that the
arresting officers had stolen millions of dollars from his

287

See Three Amigos SJL Rest., Inc. v. CBS News, Inc., 28 N.Y.3d 82, 87 (2016).
61 A.D.3d 440, 440 (1st Dep’t 2009) (quoting Lazore v. NYP Holdings, Inc., No.
08/102674, 2008 WL 6691430 at *1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Oct. 15, 2008)).
289
Lazore, 2008 WL 6691430, at *5–6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Lazore, 61 A.D.3d at 440 (citations omitted).
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Helicopter Helmet, LLC v. Gentex Corp., No. 1:17-CV-00497, 2018 WL
2023489, at *2–3 (D. Del. May 1, 2018).
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See id. at *4.
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Id.
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Haefner v. N.Y. Media, LLC, 82 A.D.3d 481, 482 (1st Dep’t 2011).
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residence.295 The bare reference to an “NYPD/DEA strike force,”
however, could not sustain a group libel claim in the absence of
more specific descriptions of individual agents.296
Nor can it fairly be said that judicial authorization of group
libel claims necessarily reflects insensitivity to First Amendment
values. In some instances, the number of members in the defamed
class is so small as to render a reference to the plaintiff altogether
plausible. In one such case, the defendant homeowner’s assertion
that he had “2 crooks” as builders justified a suit by the second
builder.297 In another, individual members of a four-attorney law
firm that was accused of charging shockingly high fees were
allowed to bring suit.298 Where the defamed group comprises a few
more members, the defendant’s unqualified charge of group
misconduct may sometimes realistically support claims by
individual members.299 Claims of this number may also proceed
where plaintiffs can credibly plead that their acquaintances would
recognize the defendant’s allegedly false statement as referring
to them.300
Nevertheless, judicial recognition of some group libel claims
raises questions about the adequacy of current eligibility for such
suits. In one case, the defendant had written that some academics
and parents’ groups “accuse[d] D.A.R.E. supporters of . . . slashing
scientists’ tires, making threatening phone calls in the middle of
the night, harassing critics’ children and even of jamming the
295
Haefner v. N.Y. Media, L.L.C., No. 150189/08, 2009 WL 634654, at *1 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. Cnty. Oct. 22, 2009), aff’d, 82 A.D.3d 481 (1st Dep’t 2011).
296
Haefner, 82 A.D.3d at 481–82. Also illustrative of widespread judicial
skepticism of group libel claims is Brummett v. Taylor, 569 F.3d 890, 891 (8th Cir.
2009), in which the group was large but identification of plaintiffs specific. Id. At a
press conference, the president of a company distributed a complaint that the
company had filed against its union and 130 named members. Id. In a libel suit by the
workers, the court determined that the president’s allegedly defamatory statements
about them at the press conference had not been shown to be understood by their
audience as specifically referring to individual plaintiffs. Id. at 893.
297
Levine v. Steve Scharn Custom Homes, Inc., 448 S.W.3d 637, 651–52 (Tex.
App. 2014) (upholding jury verdict for plaintiff).
298
See Boyce & Isley, PLLC v. Cooper, 568 S.E.2d 893, 900 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002)
(“By claiming that ‘Dan Boyce’s law firm’ had committed unethical business practices,
defendants maligned each attorney in the firm . . . .”).
299
Green v. Cosby, 138 F. Supp. 3d 114, 137 (D. Mass. 2015) (permitting suit by
three women who brought sexual assault claims against defendant in the two weeks
preceding defendant’s statement that the new claims over that period, which
numbered eleven, were entirely unfounded).
300
See, e.g., Vasquez v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 302 F. Supp. 3d 36, 66–67 (D.D.C.
2018) (involving defendant’s accusation that 9 store managers among 457 were
dismissed for a specific form of misconduct).
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television transmission of a news report to hush criticism.”301
Elsewhere the article identified the plaintiff as D.A.R.E.’s leader.
The court found that he met the “of and concerning” requirement
through a two-phased line of reasoning. First, the statements
linking “D.A.R.E. supporters” to these and other unlawful actions
“imply that such actions were undertaken at the behest, or
certainly with the approval, of the organization itself.”302 Second,
readers would “believe that actions taken on behalf of D.A.R.E.,
including unlawful behavior, were probably directed, encouraged,
or approved by” the plaintiff.303 This bootstrapping logic’s
potential for chilling criticism suggests the need for a higher
evidentiary barrier for such claims.
Similarly, another court determined that a charge of ethically
questionable behavior against a public figure’s political action
committee could plausibly be viewed as implicating the figure
herself.304 Though a somewhat more plausible conclusion, the
ruling also throws into question whether a more substantial
showing should be required to equate followers and their leaders.
Otherwise, a speech-inhibiting version of respondeat superior
might creep into group libel doctrine.
In other settings, too, multiple links in the chain connecting
plaintiffs to charges against their groups contain the potential for
excessive availability of claims. In an older case305 still cited as
authority,306 the Alabama Supreme Court ruled that the following
statement constituted libel: “The shooting occurred on Avenue E,
between Eleventh and Twelfth streets, in a house which bears a
bad reputation with the police.”307 Though the newspaper’s
account did not specify an address, identify any individuals, or
describe any reason for the “bad reputation,” the court concluded
that the article leveled an actionable charge of misconduct against
the plaintiff homeowner.308 Under the court’s reasoning, “No one
could doubt that the neighbors and friends of plaintiff . . . would

301
D.A.R.E. Am. v. Rolling Stone Magazine, 101 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1275 (C.D.
Cal. 2000).
302
Id. at 1290.
303
Id.
304
See Palin v. N.Y. Times Co., 933 F.3d 160, 172 (2d Cir. 2019).
305
Fitzpatrick v. Age–Herald Publ’g Co., 63 So. 980 (Ala. 1913).
306
E.g., Nelson v. Am. Hometown Publ’g, Inc., 333 P.3d 962, 971 (Okla. Civ.
App. 2014).
307
Fitzpatrick, 63 So. at 980.
308
See id. at 981–82.
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conclude that the libel was directed to the plaintiff.”309 The
potential breadth of liability under this theory, allowing suits
based on indefinite metonymy, threatens to curb robust reporting.
Even in the notorious case of Elias v. Rolling Stone LLC,
where the falsehood was egregious and the plaintiffs had real
cause to be upset by the publication, validation of the suit under
the small group defamation doctrine raises unsettling questions.310
In Elias, Rolling Stone magazine published an article accusing
seven unnamed members of a university fraternity of having
participated in a gang rape while two other members observed.311
When the story was discovered to have been fabricated, Rolling
Stone issued a retraction and an apology.312 In the libel action that
followed, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that each of
the fraternity’s fifty-three members at the time of the alleged
incident was entitled to bring suit.313 This decision could not be
deemed unsupportable on its face. The court’s conclusions that “a
reader could plausibly conclude that many or all fraternity
members participated in alleged gang rape as an institution ritual
and all members knowingly turned a blind eye to the brutal
crimes” were based on several passages in the article.314 Moreover,
the court emphasized the low threshold to be met for the complaint
to survive the defendants’ motion to dismiss.315
Nevertheless, the court’s reasoning contains the seeds of a
small group defamation rationale whose reach seems in tension
with the general bar against group libel actions. The court opened
the door to liability by Rolling Stone to each of the fraternity’s
fifty-three members on the premise that the article ascribed to
them all at least “guilty knowledge” of the alleged gang rape.316
That interpretation, in turn, rested largely on the article quoting
some of the nine members present at the reported rape as having
said, “ ‘Don’t you want to be a brother,’ and ‘We all had to do it, so
309

Id. at 982.
872 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2017).
311
Id. at 100–01.
312
Id. at 101.
313
Id. at 108.
314
Id. at 109.
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See id. at 105 (“Plaintiffs need only plead sufficient facts to make it plausible—
not probable or even reasonably likely—that a reader familiar with each Plaintiff
would identify him as the subject of the statements at issue.” (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009))); id. at 106 (“[The allegedly defamatory] statements are to
be read in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs . . . .”).
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Id. at 109–10 (quoting Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 84 A.D.2d 226, 227
(2d Dep’t 1981)).
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you do, too’ ”—which the court took as indicating that the rape was
an “initiation ritual.”317 In other words, these comments were
deemed to signal to the reader the article’s representation that
every member of the fraternity had committed or knew of acts of
rape.318 It is doubtful that a reasonable reader would extrapolate
from these isolated utterances the author’s own accusations
against fifty-three individuals. If current doctrine does stretch
that far, then it is time to revisit the showing required of plaintiffs
who claim harm under such an attenuated theory.
Under current doctrine, even decisions dismissing suits based
on group libel theory can sometimes highlight the unpredictability
of courts’ approaches. The treatment of claims arising from
allegedly defamatory statements about law enforcement agencies
furnishes one such example. In Bujol v. Ward, the defendant
distributed materials asserting that the Street Crimes Unit of
Jefferson Parish “has a long history of treating innocent,
law-abiding African-American citizens with hostility, excessive
force and no respect. The African-American male is a target of
abuse of this special unit.”319 The article went on to give accounts
of two allegedly representative examples of this rampant abuse.320
In an action by twenty-three members of the forty-six
member unit, the court concluded that “there [wa]s no showing
that any one individual in the class . . . [could] satisfy the
burden of showing that the words referred particularly to
them individually.”321
In Diaz v. NBC Universal, Inc., a legend at the end of a film
based on a gangster’s criminal career stated that a “collaboration”
between a police officer “led to the convictions of three quarters of
New York City’s Drug Enforcement Agency.”322 In a suit on
behalf of agents who served during the period covered by the
film—variously numbered at 400 and 233 individuals—the court
held that the legend’s reference “only to three-quarters of the
group” rendered the claim “incapable of supporting a jury’s finding
that the allegedly libelous statements refer to them as
individuals.”323
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Id. at 109.
See id. at 114 (Lohier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
778 So. 2d 1175, 1178 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
See id. at 1178–79.
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Though both of these results are defensible—even
welcome—they stand in notable contrast to the oft-cited case of
Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc.324 Seven years after eighteen
officers of a city police department were indicted on charges of
misconduct, a newspaper opined:
We said at the time, and we still believe, that the entire
department was under a cloud. It is inconceivable to us that so
much misconduct could have taken place without the guilty
knowledge of the unindicted members of the department. If so,
they all were accessories after the fact, if not before and during.325

Twenty-seven of the presumed fifty-three members of the police
force who had not been indicted, charged that the editor’s
statement was libelous.326 The court determined that the group
was sufficiently defined, the statement sufficiently specific, and
group members sufficiently identifiable that the statement could
be understood as charging each unindicted member with criminal
behavior.327 In contrast to Bujol and Diaz, however, the editor
expressed his belief—not knowledge—that unindicted officers
must have known about their colleagues’ misdeeds, and that, if his
inference was correct, these officers were accessories. Again, the
outcome in Brady cannot be condemned as wholly without
justification. A would-be critic of law enforcement, however, might
understandably exercise caution born of inability to forecast the
analysis a court would apply to a future libel suit.
V. THE NEXT FRONTIER: DEFAMATION OF AVATARS IN
VIRTUAL WORLDS
One reason for restricting plaintiffs’ ability to bring suits
based on implied defamation is the possibility of unforeseen
consequences from an unduly expansive conception of libelous
statements “of and concerning” the plaintiff. One area in which a
heightened standard of proof would especially safeguard against
runaway litigation is claims based on alleged defamation of an
electronic version of the plaintiff. Failure to impose strict limits
on ascertainability in this realm could open the floodgates to

324

84 A.D.2d 226, 240–41 (2d Dep’t 1981). The court’s application of the “intensity
of suspicion” test is discussed at supra notes 271–273 and accompanying text.
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lawsuits rooted in virtual “avatars”328 and technological matrices
yet undevised. Only where the line connecting a factual charge
against an electronically created persona with the creation’s
real-world counterpart is clear, direct, and compelling should
courts seriously entertain claims under this theory.
Virtual worlds are designed to enable users to experience
online existence as a three-dimensional reality.329 There, a user
creates a three-dimensional virtual avatar whose appearance and
personality can be chosen and changed at the user’s discretion.330
In a pioneering article on First Amendment implications of virtual
worlds, Jack Balkin expressed concern that then-current doctrine
did not adequately protect the speech rights of owners and users.331
His initial aim was to establish that virtual worlds were entitled
to recognition as a form of expression332—a status apparently
cemented by the Supreme Court’s later recognition of video games
as warranting First Amendment protection.333 He then urged
ample freedom from government interference with these worlds to
the extent they afford opportunities for designers and users to
explore their imaginations and ventilate their ideas.334 At the
same time, Balkin acknowledged that some real-world effects
produced by virtual activities—especially those involving
commodification of virtual goods and currencies—justify a degree

328

See Avatar, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF SOCIAL MEDIA (1st ed. 2016) (stating as
one definition “a figure controlled by the user in a 3-D graphical environment such as
a virtual world”); Ralitza Petit, Avatar-Space: The Ego Inc., 44 PERSPECTA 92, 94
(2011) (“One of the pioneering virtual words, Habitat . . . specifically introduced the
term avatar as the human body’s virtual counterpart in a graphically presented social
online community.” (emphasis in original)).
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For a helpful description of Second Life, a leading virtual world, see Matt
Weinberger, This Company Was 13 Years Early to Virtual Reality – and It’s Getting
Ready To Try Again, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 29, 2015, 7:34 AM), https://www.business
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See Pierre Berthon, et al., Advocating Avatars: The Salesperson in Second
Life, 30 J. PERS. SELLING & SALES MGMT. 195, 198 (2010); Chin, supra note 189,
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264 (2013).
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63 (2004).
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Id. at 63, 68–71.
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Brown v. Entm’t Merch. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011). Balkin had noted that
lower courts already recognized “first person shooter games” as falling under First
Amendment protection. Balkin, supra note 331, at 69.
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of government regulation.335 Under this rationale, he would allow
for remedies caused by “communications torts” such as copyright
and trademark violations.336 Balkin also included defamation in
this category, but merely noted that libel law “in theory” can apply
to defamation of avatars.337
A few years later, Bettina Chin developed this latter
suggestion at length and with a more definite view toward
vigorously extending libel law to this sphere.338 She described
ways in which defamation of a virtual persona can damage the
reputation and potentially the financial standing of both the
persona and her real-world counterpart.339 In contrast to Balkin,
who generally advocated a high degree of internal regulation for
virtual communities,340 Chin deemed contractual remedies
particularly inadequate to address defamation of these
communities’ residents.341 In short, “[I]f the law has specific rules
that apply to real-world instances of defamation, it should
similarly apply such rules to virtual spaces to protect the users.”342
Under Chin’s approach, a plaintiff could recover for defamation of
her avatar by showing that other residents of the virtual
community viewed the plaintiff and her avatar as inextricably
intertwined—so as to make defamation of the avatar tantamount
to defamation of herself—and that the plaintiff suffered a
real-world pecuniary harm.343
While perhaps reasonable in the abstract, such an approach
could seriously inhibit the free play of expression for which virtual
worlds exist if plaintiffs were not held to a stringent standard of
proof. As with suits based on fiction or group libel, claims of libel
of avatars require the audience to actively deduce that the alleged
335
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defamation actually referred to the plaintiff.
Even Chin
acknowledged that the centrality of role-playing in virtual worlds
creates a presumption that “defamation” of a virtual plaintiff does
not convey an actual fact about an individual.344
This
presumption, however, should be quite daunting to account for
virtual worlds’ fundamental premise of nonreality. Further, the
attenuation of the link between statements about avatars and
concrete harm to actual persons is compounded by the protean
nature of virtual residents.345 Liability for statements about an
invented character whose appearance and behaviors could change
at any time should require extraordinary justification.
Failure to impose this weighty a level of demonstration could
unleash a torrent of suits over statements maligning avatars. It
is possible that even under a less demanding approach most claims
would ultimately fall short of proving that aspersions cast on
avatars amount to defamation of plaintiffs. A more permissive
standard, however, would still enable a larger number of awards
to plaintiffs than a stringent barrier. This prospect would
generally invite more claims and allow them to survive deeper into
the litigation process. Prolonged litigation can exact substantial
costs even when it does not result in a verdict for the plaintiff.
Moreover, concerns about jurors’ capacity to assess claims of
plaintiff identity are amplified in this context. On top of absorbing
the nuances of law’s “of and concerning” requirement,
many—probably most—jurors would need instruction on the
assumptions, dynamics, and sensibilities of interactions in virtual
worlds. Thus, a heightened burden of proof would contain the
number of such claims, their costly advancement through
progressive phases of litigation, and the potential for misguided
jury awards.
Moreover, the complexity of gauging the outer-world impact
of besmirching evanescent avatars carries an additional
implication. One can decry unfair statements about virtual
residents without leaping to the conclusion that such statements
should be subjected to the full-blown machinery of existing
defamation doctrine. Any facile assumption that this relatively
new and still-evolving technology fits neatly into old paradigms
risks unduly penalizing speech whose ramifications are far from
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fully understood. Traditional libel law, even if adjusted to impose
a higher burden of showing plaintiff identity, may be too blunt an
instrument to properly weigh the competing interests at stake.
About a century ago, a news service asked the Supreme Court to
bar a competitor from copying the former’s news accounts and
selling them under the latter’s banner.346 Deeming the plaintiff
service’s interest in its reports as “quasi property”347 and the
defendant’s use of the service as “unfair competition,”348 the
Court approved injunctive relief.349 In dissent, however, Justice
Brandeis objected to the Court’s wholesale transplantation of
common law concepts to this novel circumstance. Though
acknowledging the “obvious injustice” of the defendant’s conduct,
Justice Brandeis argued that the legislature was far better
equipped to conduct the factual investigations needed for devising
an appropriate rule and to erect the machinery for enforcing it.350
With alleged libel of virtual residents, too, judicial modesty would
seem to be in order. In this area, raising the bar to prove plaintiff
identity may be only the first step in a broader resolution that
protects reputation without stifling a promising technology or
free expression.
Finally, resistance to defamation claims involving avatars has
an equitable dimension. The very purpose of virtual worlds is to
allow users to construct beings who are more than mere extensions
of themselves. Users can assume as residents of these worlds’
personal histories, ethnic identities, professions, and behaviors
quite different from their own, and to impart to their creations a
fluidity of self not available to actual humans. They can thus give
free rein to their creative impulses without fear of being
held legally accountable for the conduct of their avatars. Having
distanced themselves from their avatars, users should generally
be forbidden to claim derivative harm from attacks on their
counterparts’ reputation. Selectively conflating a user and avatar
to pursue libel claims, while insisting on separation for other
purposes, is to have it both ways and so erode the robust
expression for which virtual communities are designed.

346
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348
349
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CONCLUSION
In the decades since the Supreme Court brought defamation
within the ambit of First Amendment protection, it has devised an
array of safeguards to preserve ample breathing space for speech
while respecting the state’s interest in protecting reputation.
These constraints on states’ ability to ban libel, however, represent
constitutional minima; states are not obligated to press penalties
for defamatory expression to their constitutional limit. One means
by which states can enhance free speech without undermining
their core reputational goals is to increase the burden on plaintiffs
to demonstrate that alleged defamation actually refers to them. In
the great majority of libel suits, this change would not raise the
practical barrier for plaintiffs. It is only in those instances where
the expression at issue is not self-evidently “of and concerning” the
plaintiff that an action would founder because of this requirement.
And it is in such cases that judicial sophistication about
defamation doctrine and sensitivity to infringement on speech will
be most valuable.
Thus, the specific goal of this Article is to afford more
discretion to courts to screen from trials charges of libel that
cannot establish its definite reference to the plaintiff.
A
heightened test is justified in part by the threshold nature of
plaintiff identity; failure to show that the disputed statement is
about the plaintiff renders all other elements of the claim
irrelevant. In addition, the determination of whether speech that
does not mention plaintiffs should be treated as directed at them
is distinctly vulnerable to misapplication by juries. The specter of
such trials and attendant costs, even where a verdict for the
plaintiff is overturned on appeal, casts an immeasurable pall on
speech. The damage to First Amendment values is especially
acute where this effect dampens creative expression and reporting
on matters of public concern.
While adoption of the proposal here would not entirely dispel
the uncertainty created by the current regime, it would remove
much of the inhibition caused by fear that words that do not
expressly target individuals will give rise to actionable defamatory
inferences by these unnamed plaintiffs. The potential for such
deterrence is especially notable in the realms of fiction and
characterizations of groups. As the prospect of libel charges born
of virtual worlds illustrates, however, advancing technology
creates additional possibilities for individuals to claim that speech,
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not ostensibly about them, readily translates into speech that is.
An imposing burden on libel plaintiffs to prove the cogency of this
link will help shield against future threats to robust expression.

